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Abstract 
 
This thesis discusses an observed phenomenon of ordinary sailors being forced to 
serve on board pirate ships in the eighteenth century Atlantic World. The main argument 
is that when pirates lost their connections to land-based communities in the Caribbean at 
the end of the seventeenth century they attempted to establish the same connections to 
communities along the North American coast. Pirates in the early eighteenth century 
ultimately failed to establish lasting connections with colonies in the north and had to 
force more ordinary sailors to server on their crews in order to survive. Colonial and 
British trial records were the main primary sources used in this work along with 
newspaper articles, advertisements, official letters, captive narratives, and other 
government documents. The trial records however, stimulated the bulk of the historical 
questions and arguments made in this work. Fourteen trials were reviewed here and the 
abundance of witness testimony gave me the opportunity to find patterns in how forced 
pirates were perceived on the ship, in colonial governments, and in the British 
government. Historians have focused on the individual pirate, the pirate ship, and pirates’ 
connections to land-based communities and my work attempts to integrate each approach 
to obtain a more complete view of piracy by looking at forced pirates. Ultimately, during 
the Golden Age of Piracy there was also an underlying change to the ways pirate ships 
operated in the eighteenth century. Pirates had to adapt and survive without the resource 
of local communities. This created a whole new form of piracy which was more reliant 
on the community of piracy, more conscious of their identity as pirates, and more 
independent of any nation. 
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Introduction 
 
People think of pirates as just criminals, but at its pinnacle in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, Atlantic piracy was not just a group of sea bandits interested in 
robbing for monetary gain. The simple criminality of piracy or banditry was not enough 
to explain some of the actions of pirates in this period. For example, Alexander 
Exquemelin provided in the seventeenth century a social aspect of the buccaneers 
fighting against internal poverty that does not conform to the classification of pirates as 
only bandits. Exquemelin described reports of his exploits as a buccaneer along with his 
observations of others of the buccaneers from about 1669 to 1674. At one point he said 
that if a fellow buccaneer “has nothing, the others let him have what he needs on credit 
until such a time as he can pay them back.”1 Exquemelin did not list any conditions or 
interests associated with these loans, and he did not feel the need to describe the 
circumstance if they were not paid back. If the buccaneers were simply bandits interested 
in monetary gain, then there would be no reason for them to be magnanimous towards 
those in their group who were less fortunate. The idea that the buccaneers would not let 
their fellows go destitute shows that they were creating a community, at least among 
others within the buccaneers.    
The communal nature of pirates elevated piracy above the discourse of simple 
banditry, and this was as much a part of the seventeenth century buccaneers, as it was of 
the Golden Age pirates in the eighteenth century. In 1671, a group of buccaneers who had 
broken off from Sir Henry Morgan, which included Alexander Exquemelin, were 																																																								
1Alexander O. Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America, Translated by Alexis Brown (Mineola, NY: 
Dover Publications, 2000), 72. 
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attempting to make their way to Jamaica after an expedition to Panama. The buccaneers 
ship was in need of repairs, and they were in need of provisions as a breakaway group 
struggled against the wind along the northern coast of South America. On the course back 
to Jamaica, the buccaneers suddenly found another ship “bearing down” on them and 
“giving [them] chase.” Exquemelin explained that they were pursued by what they 
thought was a Spanish troop carrier for about twenty-four hours until the ship overtook 
them. Before any fire could be exchanged between the two ships, the buccaneers saw that 
it was filled with their “own comrades.”2 The situation did not escalate into conflict, but 
instead each ship simply went its separate way after exchanging some pleasantries about 
their origins and destinations. Similarly, in 1719 a pirate named Howell Davis was sailing 
into the Sierra Leone River off the coast of West Africa when he came upon another ship 
captained by the pirate Thomas Cocklyn. Davis and Cocklyn were surprised to find each 
other in the river and they prepared to fight. Instead, when they saw the black flags 
flying, they were “easy in their minds” about the situation and eventually the ships 
“saluted one another with their Cannon.”3 If the buccaneers and pirates discussed above 
were truly only bandits interested in plunder, then these encounters would have ended 
differently. Piracy was not just a collection of bandits, but instead a communal bond 
existed that connected pirates by something more than the pursuit of monetary gain. A 
refusal to acknowledge these communal bonds as a substantial part of piracy or to ignore 
																																																								
2 Ibid, 211.  
3 Marcus Rediker, Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (Boston: Beacon Press, 
2004), 94; William Snelgrave, A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea (London: James, John, and Paul 
Knapton, at the Crown in Ludgate Street, 1734), Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale, 199. 
  
 
   
		
	 	
3	
them completely obscures the true nature of piracy. At least in the Atlantic, and likely 
more generally piracy needs to be discussed as something more than just banditry.    
Historians of piracy have discussed individual pirates, the social and cultural 
dynamics on the pirate ship, and the political and economic relationship pirates had with 
land-based societies. These approaches to piracy have expanded historians understanding 
of a historical view of individual pirates, how they operated on board their ships, and how 
they interacted with the land.4 Now I want to bring the individual pirate, the dynamics of 
the pirate ship, and piracy’s connection to the land together and explain how they, in the 
late seventeenth century, transitioned from the Caribbean to the North American coast. 
Furthermore, how this transition forced pirates to change and these changes gave the 
Golden Age of piracy its unique characteristics in the eighteenth century.   
																																																								
4 For a discussion of individual pirates in a more historical context see Hugh Rankin, The Golden Age 
of Piracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The 
Romance and the Reality of Life Among the Pirates (New York: Random House, 1995); Gabriel Kuhn, Life 
Under the Jolly Roger: Reflections on Golden Age Piracy (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010); and Benerson 
Little, The Golden Age of Piracy: The Truth Behind Pirate Myths (New York, NY: Skyhouse Publishing, 
2016). 
For a discussion of life on the pirate ship see B. R. Burg, Sodomy & the Perception of Evil: English Sea 
Rovers in the Seventeenth-Century Caribbean (New York: NYU Press, 1983); Turley, Hans. Rum, Sodomy, 
and the Lash: Piracy Sexuality and Masculine Identity (New York: NYU Press, 1999); Marcus Rediker, 
Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004); Multiple articles 
published by Arne Bialuschewski to include the most recent article, Arne Bialuschewki, “Pirates, Black 
Sailors and Seafaring Slaves in the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1716-1726.” Journal of Caribbean 
History 45, no. 2 (December 2011): 143-158; and Gregory Flemming, At the Point of a Cutlass: The Pirate 
Capture, Bold Escape, and Lonely Exile of Philip Ashton (New England: ForeEdge, 2014).  
For a discussion of pirates connection to land-based communities see Shirley C. Hughson, The Carolina 
Pirates and Colonial Commerce, 1670-1740 (repr. 1894, Spartanburg, SC: The Reprint Company, 1971; 
Peter R. Galvin, Patterns of Pillage: A Geography of Caribbean-Based Piracy in Spanish America, 1536-
1718  (New York: Peter Lang, 1999); Douglas Burgess, The Pirates Pact: The Secret Alliances Between 
History’s Most Notorious Buccaneers and Colonial America (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009); Douglas 
Burgess, The Politics of Piracy: Crime and Civil Disobedience in Colonial America (Lebanon, NH: 
ForeEdge, 2014); and Mark Hanna, Pirate Nest and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015);  
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 The changes to piracy in the early eighteenth century caused an increase in 
pirates’ forcing more sailors to join their crews. By 1718, pirates completely lost access 
to land-based communities willing to support their operations. Until the end of the 
Golden Age of piracy around 1726, pirates had to force ordinary sailors to serve on board 
their ships in order to survive. The sailors who went aboard the pirate ships to serve 
unwillingly were not just forced to serve as part of the crew, but they were pushed to 
commit acts of piracy in order to bind them to the pirates. If any unwilling soul attempted 
to turn them in or escape from the pirates, then they in turn would be tried for piracy. 
This more desperate form of piracy in search of sailors to man their crews was the result 
of pirates being pushed out of the Caribbean and failing to maintain relationships with 
willing local land-based communities on the North American coast. 
Historians have approached the Golden Age of piracy in three ways starting in 
about the 1980s, and each approach has had unique motivations behind it and has sent the 
study of pirates in new directions. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and 
some historians employed multiple or all of the approaches in their works. The three 
approaches that will be discussed in this section will be the response to the popular image 
of pirates, the social and cultural dynamics on the pirate ship, and the political 
relationship pirates had with local land-based societies. It is important to look at these 
three approaches both chronologically and thematically, but to keep in mind that they 
were not necessarily progressive and just because an approach preceded another did not 
mean that it was necessarily born out of it. The true nature of piracy has always been 
obscured by popular culture. Recent scholarship regarding piracy is poised to move in the 
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direction of a historical interpretation rather than remain mired in popular culture and 
myth.    
One way historians approached piracy was in response to the popular culture 
image of pirates. This approach attempted to separate out or examine the fabric of pirate 
myth by looking at the individual nature and specifics traits of pirates. David Cordingly 
published his still widely popular book in 1996 titled Under the Black Flag: The 
Romance and Reality of Life Among the Pirates. This book took the popular American 
culture image of piracy from literature and film and explained the origins of pirates’ 
popular image. Cordingly’s comparison between popular image and historical record 
allowed scholars and popular audiences alike to view the individual pirate in the 
historical context in which it operated. Cordingly’s work provided a better understanding 
of the social and cultural perspective of the individual pirate. Cordingly’s contribution 
allowed historians to build an understanding of the collective nature of piracy around his 
individual perspective of pirates. Since this approach was in response to the popular 
culture image of pirates, the analysis was based on a limited scope of questions, 
Cordingly focused on the individual pirate rather than on piracy collectively. Through 
this approach the pirates day-to-day activities become clearer, but piracy as a group with 
a shared culture, values, and practices becomes more obscured. This focus was in part 
because the historical questions generated by the popular culture image were confined to 
a narrow perspective of pirates.            
 In a similar manner, Hans Turley in his book titled Rum, Sodomy, and the Lash: 
Piracy, Sexuality, and Masculine Identity published in 1999 attempted to examine the 
way the popular culture image of piracy was woven into the historical reality of piracy. 
		
	 	
6	
Turley did not want to separate myth from reality like David Cordingly; instead, he 
wanted to examine the interconnections between the two perspectives to arrive at a more 
literary view of pirates. Turley’s strategy was to use literary analysis to reinterpret the 
primary sources written about pirates like William Kidd and Henry Avery. The records of 
Kidd’s trial are taken and explored by Turley against the narrative history of works like 
Captain Charles Johnson who wrote A General History of the Pirates published in 1724.5 
Through these works, Turley explored the popular image of pirates in the eighteenth 
century, and how that image was transferred to the modern day interpretations. In 
Turley’s estimation, the popular image of pirates has influenced primary sources 
throughout history obscuring our view of them. Turley ultimately believed that the reader 
of pirate history did not want to know the reality of individual pirate daily life, but 
instead that even if the reader did want to know the truth about pirates the historian could 
not explain it due to a misunderstanding of the popular image of pirates in historical 
context. Turley brings the historical context of the popular image of individual pirates 
into view in his work, which challenges future historians of piracy to understand this as 
on obstacle when writing pirate history.  
 Historians David Cordingly and Hans Turley brought critical insights into the 
study of piracy by expanding our understanding of the individual pirate, but their 
approach obscured the true nature of piracy as a whole. Piracy was more than just a sum 
of its parts, and while the individual pirate is an important perspective to understand, it is 
not enough. Pirates must be discussed alongside the political, economic, and social 																																																								
5 Charles Johnson, (Daniel Defoe), A General History of the Robberies and Murders of the Most 
Notorious Pyrates, ed. Arthur L. Hayward (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1926). The true author of A 
General History of the Pirates is still heavily debated but the consensus is that it was written by a man 
named Daniel Defoe.     
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dynamics of local communities. Furthermore, piracy must be discussed collectively 
through a shared culture. These two historians put individual pirates into proper historical 
context, but their approach cannot take into account systematic changes in how piracy 
operated due to changes in law and politics.               
 Another approach to piracy was a discussion of the social and cultural dynamics 
on board the pirate ship. The historian best known for this was Marcus Rediker in his 
book Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age published in 2004. 
Rediker used cultural ethnography and other social and cultural theory to discuss the 
relationships and composition of the pirate crew, the politics of the ship, and how pirates 
fit into the larger narrative of the Atlantic world. Rediker explored the reasons for sailors 
to turn pirate in the eighteenth century, and he began to discuss pirates as a collective 
group with a shared value system. The value system he discussed was based on the 
dynamic relationships of the pirate ship and was structured around the idea of a more 
democratic society. Based on Rediker’s discussion, the democratic nature of the pirate 
ship was key to understanding piracy in the Atlantic world in the early eighteenth 
century. Rediker developed the argument around the pirate ship and not the individual 
pirate, which had not been done before. Rediker’s work stimulated a great deal of 
discussion and in many ways revitalized the field. Later historians have been either trying 
to emulate his work or trying to disprove his arguments.  
Rediker did pursue, among other themes, the idea of pirates as being more than 
just bandits, but his perspective was from the deck of the pirate ship. This approach did 
not allow him to discuss the relationship to local land-based societies, and therefore he 
did not fully develop the whole picture of piracy as more than just banditry. Rediker did 
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discuss the pirates’ use of terror to accomplish their goals and he simulated the field of 
piracy greatly, but he did not go far enough into discussing piracy as a collective group 
connected to the land.        
A third approach, and the last I will discuss, started from the other side with an 
exploration of the political relationship pirates had with local land-based societies. 
Douglas Burgess used this approach first in his 2008 work titled The Pirates Pact: The 
Secret Alliances Between History’s Most Notorious Buccaneers and Colonial America 
and again in a 2014 book titled The Politics of Piracy.6 In both works, Burgess focusd on 
the dynamic relationship between pirates and local colonies in America juxtaposed 
against the legal view of piracy in England. He explores the political, economic, and legal 
view of pirates in the colonies and then discusses it against the competing national 
political, economic, and legal view of pirates in England. Burgess discusses the dynamics 
of the tide of national and local privateering and the strain it put on relationships between 
colonies along with the English Board of Trade. The main theme is a discussion of the 
politically changing nature of the legality of piracy across the Atlantic World.  
Beyond that, the work by Burgess explores the society that was created by piracy 
through the legal and political land-based struggles in the American colonies and in 
England. Piracy as a whole comes into view amongst themes of the rise of the British 
Empire and yet somehow the pirate is obscured from view. Burgess fundamentally rejects 
the ideas of Rediker who argued that pirates should be viewed as more than simple 
bandits. Burgess challenges the “so-called pirate democracy” and that not every historian 
is as eager to “attribute the pirates’ activities to socioeconomic revolutionary sentiments” 																																																								
6 Douglas Burgess, The Pirates Pact: The Secret Alliances Between History’s Most Notorious 
Buccaneers and Colonial America (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009); Douglas Burgess, The Politics of 
Piracy: Crime and Civil Disobedience in Colonial America (Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge, 2014). 
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as is Rediker.7 Burgess’s approach is primarily the complete rejection of Rediker’s 
cultural approach to piracy. Burgess misrepresents piracy because he focuses only on the 
legal and political circumstances of it and he does not see pirates as more than just 
bandits. The focus of Burgess obscures the pirate from having any social or cultural 
connections to any other pirate outside the political and legal discourse, and in this way, 
his work is misguided.  
The next prominent historian to explore the political relationships pirates had with 
land-based societies was Mark G. Hanna in his 2015 work Pirate Nests and the Rise of 
the British Empire, 1570-1740. Hanna, like Burgess, looked at the dynamic relationships 
pirates had with the British colonies in the New World. Hanna went farther, however, 
because he talked about the transitions of pirates from the west coast of England in the 
sixteenth century, to the British Caribbean in the seventeenth century and all the way to 
the North American colonies in the eighteenth century. The main argument of this book 
is about showing how piracy gave rise to the British Empire. A key element in this 
argument is the call for historians to focus on “the symbiotic relationship between 
maritime marauders and landed communities” to avoid misunderstanding the “origins and 
trajectory” of piracy. 8  Hanna accomplishes explores these two arguments by 
methodically looking at the local political, economic, legal, and cultural connections of 
land-based communities with piracy within the discourse of the rise of the British 
Empire. Within this discussion, Hanna agrees at least in part with Rediker that piracy was 
more than just banditry. Despite Hanna’s agreement, he says that in order to understand 
																																																								
7 Burgess, The Politics of Piracy, 205-206. 
8 Mark G. Hanna, Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740 (Williamsburg, VA: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015). 416. 
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pirates as more than just bandits it is important to focus on their “local circumstances on 
land.”9  
Another interesting dynamic to Hanna’s approach is his integration of local and 
national commissioned privateers. Unlike most historians of piracy, Hanna discusses the 
nature of state sponsored piracy and the frequent shifts into “illegal” piracy. The 
dynamics between privateers and pirates effortlessly integrates into a more holistic view 
of piracy when the land-based communities are discussed. Overall, the approach used by 
Hanna explains piracy on land and at sea from the perspective of the land-based 
communities and the British Empire. Hanna approached piracy as a vehicle for social, 
political, legal, and cultural change on land and because of his approach pirate culture on 
the ship was obscured in his work.       
The most significant contribution made by Burgess and Hanna was thus a 
reorientation to pirates as irrevocably connected to local societies and not just the ocean. 
This idea is the third piece of the puzzle to a complete view of piracy, but in all the works 
discussed above that used the connections pirates had to local land-based communities 
something is still missing. It is almost like we have three sides of a triangle drawn, but it 
has not yet been colored in. On one side, we have a better understanding of the individual 
pirates, on another we have the dynamic relationships on the pirate ship, and on the final 
one we have the pirates’ connection to local land-based societies. In the center of the 
triangle we need to start shading in a more complete view of piracy in the Atlantic world, 
and the way its characteristics develop come out of these three defining edges.  
The process by which a more complete understanding of piracy comes into view 
starts with defining it. To understand pirates as both a social community, and part of 																																																								
9 Ibid, 13. 
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larger political context, we need to realize that pirates are not simply criminals. The 
general definition of pirates is as sea robbers who have no commission from a “legal 
authority, who target all ships” using guerilla tactics “regardless of the national colors 
they fly,” but rely on a willing local community to support their operations at sea.10 More 
complexly, piracy is an ideological insurgency and a form of social banditry at sea and 
needs to be discussed more collectively and less individually. Therefore, a more fitting 
definition is that piracy is a collection of social bandits who work within local 
communities’ political systems to target either selected enemy ships or all ships, 
regardless of national colors, and with a reliance on willing local populations to support 
their operations at sea. Pirates will subsequently be defined as insurgents, guerillas, and 
social bandits throughout this work in order to establish a more holistic view of piracy. 
Defining pirates as more than just criminals by equating them with insurgents, guerillas, 
and social bandits is in an effort to work within the constraints of terminology when 
talking about them, while still providing a better understanding of piracy as whole. 
Pirates do not fit neatly into the definition of the three groups listed, but there is a 
significant amount of overlap to warrant some discussion. Piracy already has a problem 
with complexities in terminology, which will become clear in a later discussion of 
privateers and buccaneers. To the point, equating pirates with insurgents attempts to 
escape the individualistic paradigm of the pirate as a criminal, antihero, or radical and 
discuss a more collective paradigm of piracy. This new paradigm endeavors to bring 
these ideas together and show that pirates cannot be classified as simple criminals. 
																																																								
10 Gabriel Kuhn, Life Under the Jolly Roger: Reflections on Golden Age Piracy (Oakland, CA: PM 
Press, 2010), 7. Part of this definition comes directly from that made by Kuhn in his discussion of the 
problems surrounding the definition of a pirate.  
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Instead, pirates have to be viewed through the paradigm of insurgents, guerillas, and 
social bandits.  
An insurgent or guerilla is a rebel or a revolutionary who uses guerrilla tactics and 
terrorism to make war against a larger stronger force. In broader terms, an insurgency is a 
form of irregular war where a small non-state group attempts to win a war or at least 
survive without conforming to the rules of a nation state. Fundamentally, insurgencies are 
how the weak make war against the strong. An insurgency is not tied to a specific 
ideology, period, or culture. This is not to say that insurgencies have no ideology or 
culture, but that one insurgency is not necessarily ideologically connected to another. The 
thread that universally binds insurgences together is their use of guerrilla tactics and 
terror.11  
Pirates were similar to guerillas because of their use of tactics and reliance on 
local communities for support. The emergence of the term guerrilla originated from the 
early nineteenth century when small groups of Spanish resisted Napoleon’s occupation, 
and while this was not the first instance of the use of guerilla tactics, it is where the idea 
acquired its name.12 Generally, guerrillas do not try to fight an opponent directly in large 
battles but instead use a numerally superior force to attack a small group, outpost, or 
supply line to inflict damage and then retreat quickly. Similarly, pirates’ usually selected 
small quick vessels in order to capture vessels with speed, evade capture if outgunned or 
maneuvered, and hid in bays with shallow water.13 Guerrilla tactics employ surprise and 																																																								
11 Anthony James Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A History, Biographical, and Bibliographic Sourcebook 
(Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1996), 3-7; John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How 
Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Out World (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011) 1-13; David 
Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), ix-x. 
12 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 4.  
13 Benerson Little, The Sea Rovers Practice: Pirate Tactics and Techniques, 1630-1730 (Washington, 
DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 41-43. 
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the terrain to its advantage usually attacking away from population centers to isolate the 
opponent in order to defeat them quickly and quietly. Supply routes are preferred targets 
of guerrilla tactics because of their long-term effect on their opponents’ physical fighting 
condition and moral. The tactic is usually an ambush where the supply train is surprised 
using advantageous terrain features to the insurgent so the opponent has little or no 
chance of escape.14 Pirates employed similar tactics when they would ambush fishing 
vessels in the bays around Nova Scotia and Newfoundland in the eighteenth century. 
Another requirement for guerillas to survive is good relationships with local 
communities. Primarily this means good intelligence for guerillas in order to surprise the 
enemy and escape quickly. Since pirates operated at sea, the relationship to local 
communities was different then that of guerillas. Pirates had to rely on local communities 
for information, supplies, and recruits in order to survive.             
Insurgents also use terror or terrorism as a tactic to win or survive against a larger 
and stronger force. Like guerilla tactics, this method employs small units as its major 
fighting force and the element of surprise is highly favored, but that is where the 
similarities end. The main objective of terrorism is to either kill or threaten the innocent 
as a way of coercing the strong to submit to their demands. The use of violence against 
civilians is intended to spread fear and intimidate populations and governments at the 
local and national level. Terrorism is fundamentally a tactic of a specific ideological 
insurgency just like the use of guerilla tactics.15 Despite this disconnection, Rediker 
classified pirates as terrorists when he wrote that piracy “was a terror of the weak against 
																																																								
14 Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, 3-5.  
15 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 5; Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 187. 
		
	 	
14	
the strong.”16 He continued with this idea that pirates were terrorists because of the 
tactics they used on the pirate ship. This was the first discussion of the idea of pirates as 
something other than simple bandits, but it was not fully developed because Rediker only 
discussed this idea from the deck of the pirate ship. As we saw previously in the 
historiography, the idea of pirates as something more than simple bandits resurfaced 
when historians started to discuss pirates’ connections to local land-based communities. 
Pirates also used symbols to instill fear into their enemies and one example was the pirate 
flag. The pirate flag was raised when pirates were in pursuit of a prize to intimidate the 
opponent into surrendering without confrontation. Terror tactics played a major role in 
the success of piracy into the eighteenth century.       
Piracy fits into this explanation of insurgents through the term Social Banditry. 
The problem is observed when attempting to classify pirates as rebels or revolutionaries 
and the main hurdle is to overcome the dominance of the pursuit of plunder in the pirate 
profession. In simple terms a revolutionary is defined as an individual who uses violence 
to bring about change to the “structure, policies, and leadership of government and 
society.”17 Pirates were bandits interested in monetary gain on the surface, but they fit 
into this realm of revolutionaries based on what scholars of insurgents call Social 
Bandits. In short, this is a type of insurgency reserved for groups who have higher goals 
and attempt to “redress injustices within a society.”18 This first type of Social Banditry as 
it relates to pirates and their higher goals will be explored later in this work through their 
																																																								
16 Rediker, Villains of All Nations, 6.  
17 Sam C. Sarkesian, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975), 
vii. 
18 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 242.  
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relationships with local colonial governments like South Carolina, Rhode Island, and 
Boston. 
A second attribute of Social Banditry is the Avenger who strikes back at those 
who they see as their tormentors or to “prove that even the poor and weak can be 
terrible.”19 As a way of partial explanation, we see that some sailors turned pirate in the 
eighteenth century because of the harsh treatment they received while on board merchant 
and naval ships. The harsh treatment caused sailors to rise up, turn pirate, and avenge 
themselves along with other sailors who continued to suffer under the torment of 
merchant captains. 20  Therefore, pirates’ were unquestionably bandits interested in 
plunder, but this was only the most visible reason for their targeting of mostly merchant 
ships. A few other reasons they attacked these ships were to correct the problem they saw 
in society of merchant captain power, avenge the treatment they had received, and 
liberate others they felt were under the same torment. The sailors who turned pirate to 
fight their tormentors showed that pirates were interested in some form of social change 
and that piracy as a whole was more than just the pursuit of plunder. In this way, the 
perception that pirates were motivated solely by the pursuit of plunder can be questioned 
and a more holistic view of piracy can be achieved.  
Scholars of insurgency and guerrilla warfare should talk about pirates as 
insurgents and guerilla warriors, but they do not because they have generalized the 
fundamental nature of piracy. These scholars define pirates as criminals only interested in 
monetary gain, but they have only dismissed pirates in this way because they do not fully 
																																																								
19 Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969), 58.  
20 Rediker, Villains of All Nations. Rediker argues that a reason for the willingness of sailors to turn 
pirate was because of the harsh treatment received by sailors on board merchant and naval ships during the 
eighteenth century.   
		
	 	
16	
understand the complex nature of piracy. If anything there is a need to take a deeper look 
at piracy not entirely focusing on the individual pirates, but on piracy as a whole. Piracy 
was far more complex than its most visible characteristic as criminals only interested in 
monetary gain. Historians of piracy do not talk about pirates as insurgence or Social 
Bandits despite the fact that most pirates were more than simple bandits. What has made 
historians of piracy dance around the prospect of classifying pirates in this way? The 
reason has been because the dominant discourse has placed the pirate operating at sea 
because most historians have disconnected the pirate from land-based societies, except 
for the buccaneers.  
Terminology in the discussion of pirates in history has served to represent a one-
dimensional caricature of the individual pirate and disconnects them from land-based 
communities. The complication in pirate terminology comes about when historians 
attempt to define a pirate. Cordingly defined a pirate as “someone who robs and plunders 
on the sea.”21 Defining piracy is often the most difficult, but most critical part of 
discussing pirates in historical context. Historians have often found it easier to start by 
eliminating the groups associated with piracy, but doing this leads to a misunderstanding 
of piracy. The definition of piracy given by Cordingly may sound logical, but it does not 
account for privateers. Privateers were officially sponsored pirates and commissioned to 
attack a government’s enemies. These privateers were individuals or organizations 
capable of outfitting a privately owned vessel with no financial assistance from the nation 
or political body granting the commission. The nation in return for granting commissions 
would be paid part of the privateers’ plunder. If two nations were at war, then one nation 																																																								
21 Narrow definition of piracy found in David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and 
the Reality of Life Among the Pirates (New York: Random House, 1995). 
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could commission privateers to attack the other’s trade or invade colonies, but historians 
have discussed privateers as something disconnected from piracy. In most cases, 
privateering has been attributed to a national tactic of war, and privateers were not 
considered pirates because they had a completely different social, cultural, economic, and 
political dynamic with the powerful nations across the globe. The simple definition of a 
pirate provided by Cordingly attempted to do just that because privateers robbed on the 
sea as well.  
Gabriel Kuhn removed privateers in order to give a narrow definition of pirates. 
Kuhn wrote that pirates were “only those sea robbers who carry no license by any legal 
authority, who target all ships, regardless of the national colors they fly.”22 Kuhn 
removed privateers from being included in the definition of piracy by saying that only 
pirates had no commission or national allegiance, which is more narrow, but in terms of 
individual pirates and not piracy as a whole. During the seventeenth century, but less in 
the eighteenth, colonies and nations were consistently at war with each other either on a 
local or national scale. During times of relative peace between nations non-state sanction, 
no legal commissions, acts of aggression against trade was considered piracy. In the 
context of the seventeenth century it is almost impossible to completely separate 
privateering from piracy. No historian of seventeenth century piracy, to my knowledge, 
even attempts it. So then why is it so widely accepted when historians of the Golden Age 
of piracy in the eighteenth century attempt to separate the two? This is not something that 
will be discussed directly in this work, but pirate historians need to address this issue. An 
attempt will be made in this work to include the characteristics of privateers in the 																																																								
22 Kuhn, Life Under the Jolly Roger, 7-9. This whole concept of the wide and narrow definition of 
piracy is taken from the discussion Kuhn has in this book. In my opinion, of all the attempts at a definition 
of a pirate this one works the best for me.  
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discussion of pirates in order to provide a more complete view of piracy that Khun’s 
narrow definition obscures.  
This work is organized into four chapters. The first chapter sets the stage for 
piracy in the eighteenth century by discussing its shift from the Caribbean to the North 
American coast. The rise and fall of pirate communities in Tortuga, Port Royal, 
Providence island, and New Providence island are discussed to show the power pirates 
held in the Caribbean in the seventeenth century. Also included in this chapter is what 
geographic characteristics were beneficial to pirates in the Caribbean. The next two 
chapters are case studies in different colonies of the North American coast. The colonies 
local political, economic, legal, and social relationships with pirates are explored starting 
in the seventeenth century and going into the eighteenth century. South Carolina and 
Rhode Island receive the most attention to show the success and failure pirates had in 
establishing strongholds along the North American coast. Boston is used as an example 
of a colony that was not friendly towards pirates going into the eighteenth century. Nova 
Scotia and Newfoundland are used as examples to show the limitations of pirates when 
they had no land-based communities to support them. Finally, the last chapter looks at 
how piracy changed when it was disconnected from the support of land-based 
communities. The result of this disconnection was that pirates had to force more ordinary 
sailors to serve as part of their crews in order to survive. 
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I.   Caribbean Piracy in the Seventeenth Century   
 
By the early eighteenth century, pirates of the Golden Age were geographically 
limited to the Atlantic, more specifically along the North American coast. All the world 
oceans, with minor exceptions, were closed to this group of pirates. With the signing of 
Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, which ended the War of Spanish Succession, pirates’ mobility 
declined and their ability to navigate the seas relatively free from national sovereignty 
was over. After the treaty was signed, groups of pirates, formerly privateers, broke off 
and went to the South Seas, the Indian Ocean, and the North American coast. The South 
Sea and the Indian Ocean pirates had limited success as long as they didn’t draw attention 
in the eighteenth century, but most successful pirates established themselves in the 
Atlantic Ocean.23 
The West African Coast still offered some opportunities, but with the rise of the 
slave trade, nations defended those waters more furiously to protect their economic 
interests. The heightened defense of Africa’s West Coast signaled that pirate ships would 
not make it back and forth to the Indian Ocean with any constancy. Furthermore, by 
1716, pirates were almost completely expelled from the Caribbean because of increasing 
economic interests requiring protection from powerful nations. This process is 
fundamental to an understanding of the Golden Age of piracy, which was shaped at a 
very basic level by the need to replace the lost pirate havens of the Caribbean, but the 																																																								
23 The South Seas was controlled by the Spanish and pirates and buccaneers had found success in this 
area in the seventeenth century. The successful pirates and buccaneers always returned periodically to the 
Caribbean to sell their plunder in friendly ports. In the eighteenth century pirates were kicked out of the 
Caribbean and so with the South Seas still being controlled by the Spanish they had no safe place to go to 
sell their plunder. A similar situation was occurring in the Indian Ocean along with a greater number of 
European ships patrolling the waters off the African coast. Pirates could no longer outfit their ships in the 
Caribbean or the North American coast and safely make it to the Indian Ocean and back.      
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Golden Age pirate cannot be understood in historical context without a discussion of how 
this process occurred. 
Throughout the seventeenth century the Caribbean was known as the hub of pirate 
activity where pirates controlled port cities like Tortuga, Port Royal, Providence Island, 
and New Providence Island. These pirate strongholds were fortified locations which 
provided pirates a safe place to resupply and repair their ships, but more importantly they 
were politically, economically, and social accepting of pirates. By the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries national powers forced pirates out of the Caribbean and 
into the fringes of the North American British colonies. 
 Piracy in the Caribbean throughout the seventeenth century was incontrovertibly 
connected to land-based communities. This was possible because of the shifting local, 
geopolitical, and economic struggles. Piracy thrived in the Caribbean because it was on 
the periphery of the global trade and because a power vacuum opened with the decline of 
the Spanish empire, opening space for colonies from other empires and culminating in a 
series of national conflicts, which continued in the Caribbean even after empires made 
their peace in Europe. Pirates or “brethren of the coast” rose out of these circumstances 
and influenced local trade, integrated into legitimate work on land, and assisted with the 
overthrow of colonies. Piracy grew to new heights starting in the mid seventeenth century 
across the globe, but pirates could not operate without willing local communities to 
support them in the Caribbean.24  
In reference to pirates in the seventeenth century the term buccaneers is closely 
associated with piracy. Rather than attempt to separate pirates from buccaneers they need 																																																								
24 Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas 1500-1750 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1998) 
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to be integrated into the definition in order to understand piracy as a whole. Most 
historians of piracy disregard pirates’ relationships with land-based societies and relegate 
pirates only to the sea. When land-based pirates are talked about in history the term 
buccaneer is most affectionately used to discuss pirates from the seventeenth century 
who plundered on land and at sea. A distinguishable characteristic of buccaneers was 
their ability to shift back and forth between raiding towns and plundering vessels in 
harbors to plundering vessels at sea, but more important was their ability to reintegrate 
into law-abiding land-based society through legitimate work like hunting and lumber 
cutting when needed. The ability to reintegrate into land-based social structures is the key 
difference that is used by historians to separate the eighteenth century Golden Age pirate 
from the seventeenth century Buccaneer. This difference, however, has become a net in 
which to catch all the other characteristics of the buccaneers and keep the connections 
pirates had to the land from being discussed in the Golden Age of piracy. The definition 
of piracy that includes nothing about the pirates’ relationship to land-based societies is 
destined to misinterpret the true nature of piracy. To start the discussion, we will explore 
how pirates in the late seventeenth century transitioned from the Caribbean to the North 
American coast. Then how this transition created a shock to pirates, which forced them to 
change, and these changes gave the Golden Age of piracy its unique characteristics. 
In the seventeenth century, pirates in the Caribbean easily found refuge, recruits, 
provisions and places to repair their ships. After they were driven out of the Caribbean, 
pirates needed to find new locations along the North American coast that could serve 
these functions. In a pioneering study, Peter Galvin developed geographical patterns to 
explain the movement and connection to the land pirates had from the fifteenth to the 
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early eighteenth centuries.25  He did not, however, talk about the North American coast or 
how pirates operated after 1718. This cutoff was most likely due to the last pirate port at 
New Providence Island being destroyed in the Caribbean by 1718. His geographical 
analysis is useful to understanding how pirates were connected to the land into the 
Golden Age of piracy along the North America coast.  
In order to better understand the Golden Age pirates’ connection to the land, we 
need to understand just what the pirates lost in the Caribbean. The first location type was 
the pirate island haunts, which were either islands or archipelagos with “fruits, fish, 
turtles, game, wood, and water, that served as refuges” or rendezvous for pirates.26 In the 
Caribbean, there were ten pirate haunts, including San Blas, Escudo de Veraguas, and the 
Bay Island along the northern coast of South America and the Ile a Vache, Saona, the 
Bahamas, the Caymans, Isle of Pines, and the South Cays around Cuba as well as the 
island of Hispaniola. These pirate island haunts became spots where pirates repaired 
their ships and marooned captives or sailors who were unwilling to join their crew. 
Pirates selected these spots for two reasons: first these were great places to careen their 
ships, and second they were the best turtling grounds in the Caribbean.27 These locations 
																																																								
25 Peter Galvin, Patterns of Pillage: A Geography of Caribbean-Based Piracy in Spanish America, 
1536-1718 (New York: Peter Lang, 1999) 
26 Ibid, 75. 
27 Peter Earl, The Pirate Wars (London: Methuen, 2003), 51; Galvin, Patterns of Pillage, 84-85. Peter 
Earl wrote that careening was necessary to maintain the wooden hull of any sailing vessel. Galvin wrote 
that all manner of “assorted marine animals clinging to the sides and bottoms of ships reduced their speed 
and corrupted the planking.” In the tropical Caribbean, the worst was the teredo worm that dug into the 
wooden planks and destroyed the hull over a long voyage. The process of careening required several key 
resources, and therefore these were limiting factors in the locations pirates could choose. The 
characteristics of a careening spot as described by Galvin was a beach with a “tidal pattern … conducive to 
grounding, heeling, and re-floating the ship.” Heeling was the term used for tipping or leaning the vessel so 
the crew could work on the keel, the very bottom of the ship, to the waterline of both sides of a vessel. The 
resources required at these locations included wood, for propping up the ship and replacing damaged 
planks, along with “a good supply of pitch, tallow, or some other animal grease (seal, sea-lion, or turtle fat) 
for protective coating.” With these factors, the choices of locations for pirates was limited and therefore the 
best spots were continually used. Turtling was the when sailors or pirates would capture sea turtles from 
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had resources to help sustain pirate operations, but they were not close to any colonies or 
communities. The pirate island haunts were mostly useful to pirates for resources and 
safety while repairing their ships, but they did not offer much in the way of recruits.     
The second location type described by Galvin was what he called the pirate coast, 
which was not clearly identified on the map but “consist[ed] of swampy, economically 
limited, serpentine shorelines that created perfect hideouts along the Caribbean and Gulf 
coasts.”28 These locations were less about the availability of provisions and more about 
safety. These locations were sometimes connected to pirates collecting of luxury 
resources for trade, as in the Bay of Honduras along the South American northern coast 
where buccaneers in the seventeenth century would go to cut logwood for the dye trade.29 
The rivers and swampy regions from Florida to South Carolina shared many similarities 
with the northern coast of South America, which was the epitomy of the pirate coast. In 
addition, the rivers along the North American coast offered great locations for pirates to 
seek safety.  
The third location type described by Galvin in the Caribbean represented the 
“pinnacle of pirate success” and was called the pirate port.30 The pirate port was an 
established port with some type of defensive battlements usually located on a small 
island. The characteristics of these locations shared much in common with the pirate 
island haunts with a few additions: “they had to be strategically located for maximum 
striking capability[,]… [with] a market for captured goods,” a population for recruits, and 
																																																																																																																																																																					
beaches or in the shallow water around islands. Turtles were excellent sources of food for sailors because 
turtles could be kept alive on board vessels for weeks if not months with little support. Pirates would 
combine careening their vessels with turtling in the Caribbean.      
28 Galvin, Patterns of Pillage, 75. 
29 Logwood is a tree that when processed is used to naturally dye textiles and leather.   
30 Galvin, Patterns of Pillage, 75.  
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a community friendly to pirates.31 A few other common characteristics were “good 
harbors, docking facilities, and the kinds of recreational opportunities that have always 
attracted sailors.”32 There were four pirate ports in the Caribbean which included 
Tortuga, Providence Island, Port Royal, and New Providence. These pirate ports 
flourished in the Caribbean “only briefly before being subsumed by the more legitimate 
colonial enterprises of the French, English, and Dutch.”33  
Pirates were ultimately displaced from the Caribbean due to increased unfriendly 
national interests and the destruction of their pirate ports. The rise of plantation farming 
in the Caribbean gave rise to large profits for powerful nations like Britain, Spain, 
Portugal, and France. In the eighteenth century, sugar plantations stimulated trade and the 
need for labor. Powerful nations took a harder stance on piracy in the Caribbean through 
legal and military measures because of the wealth generated by the colonies in this area. 
In order for pirates to survive they had to move and attempt to establish these ports in 
other areas. Pirates true strength was in their ability to plunder ships and influence trade 
to their advantage with the least amount of fighting required.                
Before pirates were mostly expelled from the Caribbean because of increased 
national interests they held a significant amount of power in the seventeenth century to 
influence local trade. One example was the initial exchange pirates in the Caribbean had 
with Sir Thomas Modyford, the newly appointed governor of the English-controlled 
colony at Port Royal. By 1664, Sir Thomas Modyford in his first few months as governor 
attempted to stimulate open trade with the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean by 
punishing the buccaneers he found operating around Port Royal. Instead of retaliating 																																																								
31 Ibid, 95. 
32 Ibid, 96.  
33 Ibid, 75.   
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against the governor or Port Royal, the remaining buccaneers left Jamaica for friendlier 
ports near Tortuga and Hispaniola. This caused such a sharp decline in the trade to Port 
Royal that the governor quickly altered his tactics and began supporting all forms of 
piracy in the Caribbean.34 Governor Modyford misjudged the buccaneers as simple 
bandits who were interfering with open trade with the Spanish, but it appeared that the 
buccaneers were helping trade. The buccaneers were indeed most likely helping trade, but 
they were keeping the power in their hands instead of the community. Modyford could 
either choose to accept the sharp decline in trade, which was possibly temporary, and 
pursue open trade with the Spanish or return to working with the buccaneers. The 
governor quickly returned to the economic stability of the buccaneers rather than risk 
failing with his long-term goal of open trade with the Spanish. This complete capitulation 
shows how much power the buccaneers held in the Caribbean on local trade, and they 
could exercise this power with beneficial results when they had more than one willing 
local community to retreat to.      
The pirate society of the seventeenth century could also reintegrate into legitimate 
work on land, but this stratagem was less successful when they did not have a willing 
local community to trade with. An example of this characteristic of pirate society in the 
seventeenth century was the pirate stronghold known as Tortuga. Tortuga would come to 
be the most enduring and significant pirate stronghold in the Caribbean. Buccaneers of 
mixed nationalities starting on this island as early as 1603 were known for hunting feral 
cattle and pigs and then trading the meat and hides to individuals or local communities in 
close proximity. Throughout the seventeenth century, the island changed hands between 
Spanish, English, and French control almost half a dozen times, but the buccaneers 																																																								
34 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 111.  
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always returned after a new political structure was established. Each time Tortuga was 
razed to the ground by the Spanish or when there was only a small contingent of Spanish 
to protect the island the buccaneers returned when another empire started sending 
colonists. In 1665, when the French West India Company took over control of Tortuga 
the buccaneers experienced their most successful time. The success of the buccaneers 
was not that the French took over the island and encouraged the buccaneers, but they 
allowed the buccaneers to trade openly, and the local government even commissioned 
them at some points. The open acceptance of buccaneers from about 1665-1675 allowed 
them to fluctuate between piracy and more legitimate endeavors, which stimulated the 
growth of piracy in the area. After 1676, however, the local community deteriorated 
when the colonial capital was moved to Port-de-Paix and no new colonists were brought 
into Tortuga. By 1691, Tortuga was completely devoid of a political structure, and the 
buccaneers had abandoned the island altogether.35    
Providence Island was of little economic interest to the Spanish when it was first 
found in the sixteenth century, but in 1629 it was colonized by the English “pirate-
minded Earl of Warwick” and the Providence Island Company. The island is located 
between the Bay of Honduras and Panama just off the coast of modern day Nicaragua. 
Pirates and privateers used the port established by the Providence Island Company to 
plunder the Spanish Panama trade until 1640. Spain captured Providence Island in 1640 
and held it until 1670 when Sir Henry Morgan took it without firing a shot. Morgan and 
other buccaneers used this pirate port until 1671 to launch attacks on San Lorenzo and 
																																																								
35 Galvin, Patterns of Piracy, 119, 139-168.  
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eventually Panama. Before Morgan finally left the island in 1671, for Port Royal, he 
destroyed the fortifications so it could not be used by the Spanish or the buccaneers.36 
Another location in the Caribbean that became a pirate port was on the Island of 
Jamaica. The Spanish had little interest in the Island of Jamaica because it did not offer 
resources in gold or silver, but they did establish a small settlement called Santiago de la 
Vega, modern day Spanish Town, in the sixteenth century. Pirates raided the shoreline 
several times while the island was under Spanish control. By 1655, the conflicts between 
England and Spain had escalated and Santiago de La Vega was taken by the English after 
they had failed attempt to take Santo Domingo. Pirates and privateers were welcomed in 
the English colony because they brought in lucrative trade. In 1664, when Thomas 
Modyford became governor, piracy gained even more support and was able to spread 
farther, after an initial setback with the governor. The acceptance of privateers and pirates 
in Port Royal reached its highest level when Morgan, a notable buccaneer, was made 
Lieutenant Governor in 1674. Into the 1680s, political and economic support of privateers 
and pirates in Port Royal declined because of more reputable trade, but piracy was not 
completely removed from the colony. In 1692, however, a massive earthquake sank most 
of the town into the ocean and killed over a third of its population. Port Royal, Jamaica, 
was not rebuilt, and pirates were no longer able to use it as a safe port.37                       
The final pirate port in the Caribbean was on New Providence Island, which was 
located north of Cuba and about 180 miles east of the coast of Florida. The Bahama 
Islands, to include New Providence Island, in the late seventeenth century was governed 
																																																								
36 Ibid, 96-99. 
37 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 102-110; and Galvin, Patterns of Pillage, 102-106. 
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by the same proprietary government that governed the Carolinas.38 In 1684, the colony 
was burned to the ground by the Spanish, but was rebuilt in 1695 under Governor Sir 
Nicholas Trott and named Nassau.39 The pirate Henry Avery landed in Nassau in 1696 
and brought in significant plunder from a cruise he had made to the Indian Ocean. 
Avery’s plunder allowed him to influence the government and turn into a pirate port. The 
colony suffered raids from the Spanish, during the War of Spanish Succession because of 
its pirate association. The governors that had been appointed by the Lord Proprietors 
when Trott left office in 1696 had failed to establish their authority, and the colony was 
without a formal government.40 Pirates and privateers continued to occupy Nassau into 
the eighteenth century.  
In 1715, a Spanish treasure fleet wrecked off the coast of Florida after a 
devastating hurricane. Once news spread of the wrecked fleet, it created a boom in piracy 
around the Bahamas, drawing in pirates and privateers alike. One privateer named Henry 
Jennings sailed from Jamaica, to recover some of the treasure, but upon his return he 
found that he was branded a pirate. Instead of returning to Jamaica he sailed for the 
Bahamas and the Island of New Providence.41 Piracy increased in the Bahamas and up 
the North American coast until only one pirate port remained in the Caribbean at New 
Providence Island. Woodes Rogers, a former privateer, was given a commission in 1718 
to sail to New Providence Island and re-appropriated it for England. When Rogers arrived 																																																								
38 Proprietary government was one of the ways a colony could be governed. The proprietary colonies 
were basically privately run governments where a group of lords would make decisions for how to run the 
colony. These colonies did not answer directly to the British government. Other forms of colonial 
governments were charter and royal colonies.      
39 This was the uncle of Judge Nicholas Trott from South Carolina. Judge Trott of South Carolina will 
be discussed later in Chapter 2. 
40 Galvin, Patterns of Pillage, 106-108; and David Cordingly, Pirate Hunter of the Caribbean: The 
Adventurous Life of Captain Woodes Rogers (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2012), 132-
135. 
41 Earl, Pirate Wars, 160.  
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he took the island from the pirates and the Governorship. New Providence Island would 
no longer be a place for pirates to find safe harbor in the Caribbean, but the transition of 
pirates to the North American coast had begun before the destruction of this last pirate 
port.  
 The history of pirate ports in the Caribbean showed that in order for pirates to 
survive, influence trade, and generally be successful they had to have a local community 
willing to support them. When pirates controlled several pirate ports they were able to 
weld economic power in order to influence trade in an area. If an empire stopped sending 
colonists to a pirate port, then pirates were no longer able to survive in that area. The 
lesson learned from piracy in the Caribbean during the seventeen century was that piracy 
could not survive without local communities and the level of success was dependent on 
how many they controlled.        
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II.  The Carolina Colonies and Pirates: 1696-1718   
 
 
 
In order to survive pirates needed a place where they were welcomed and in the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries they were welcomed in the Carolinas. 
During the transition out of the Caribbean pirates were searching for strongholds along 
the British North American colonial coastline. Understanding the shifting economic, 
political, and social interests of the different groups in the Carolina colonies will help 
uncover how the pirates achieved temporary success in claiming South Carolinas as a 
stronghold, but how it ultimately ended in failure. The failure of pirates to maintain South 
Carolina as a stronghold shaped the future of piracy along the North American coast.     
Limited primary sources exist to explain the extent of pirates’ role in the Carolina 
colonies history into the eighteenth century. Pirates either left little personal accounts of 
their exploits or they simply did not survive, which makes it difficult to understand the 
extent of pirate movements and operations in an area. The pirates that did leave records 
were from the seventeenth century, and they were not active on the North American 
coast. Therefore, using those records to talk about pirate activity into the eighteenth 
century along the Carolinas is difficult. Second, when American colonial governments 
had dealings with pirates they were operating outside the British law and therefore some 
would not document their transactions. The lack of primary source documents from both 
pirates and the colonial officials force the historian to look at third party observations of 
pirate activity, which are less effective and more biased in discussing historical change.   
Despite these limitations, these third-party records indeed showed that piracy was 
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observed in the Carolina colonies from the late seventeenth to the early eighteenth 
centuries.42 
In order to explore the extent of the role pirates played in the Carolina colonies 
and how the region shaped the future of piracy it is necessary to examine late seventeenth 
century documented accounts of piracy in the Carolinas, the geographic resources that 
made the Carolina coast a suitable hide out for pirates, the role of piracy in the slave trade 
to the Carolinas into the eighteenth century, and finally the four pirate trials held in the 
Carolina colony of Charlestown. A look at these will show that the Carolina coast was a 
significant pirate hideout and the Carolina colonist had friendly dealings with pirates 
from the early years of the colony to the early eighteenth century. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to explore how pirates went from being welcomed in South Carolina to 
being cast out of the region. Pirates were cast out of South Carolina because they were no 
longer politically and economically contributing to the success of the colony. When 
pirates were cast out they increased their efforts to demand support from the colony, 
which ultimately failed. Pirates inability to generate lasting support in South Carolina 
caused them to become more violent and force more unwilling recruits onto their ships.  
South Carolina was a unique colony because of its physical distance from the 
other American colonies and this created complex geopolitical dangers for the colony. On 
the frontier, the relationships between multiple Indian groups and European colonists 
around South Carolina continued to degrade until war broke out in 1715. The complex 																																																								
42 For a few accounts of piracy see “Memorial of Sir Robert Robinson to the King, America and West 
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231. British History Online, accessed June 7, 2017; and also “Governor Nicholson to the Council of Trade 
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nature of the Yamasee War caused lasting economic problems for the South Carolina 
colony at Charlestown.43 Spain and France colonial holdings were seen as threats to 
English national and local interests because the Spanish were located in Florida and the 
French on the southwest frontier. After 1713, Spain and France were technically at peace 
with Britain and the American colonies, but the French continued to build outposts near 
South Carolina and they also supplied the Indians with weapons. The Spanish were not as 
great of a threat to South Carolina as the French, but from 1715 to 1719 Charlestown 
received intelligence that the Spanish were plotting to attack the colony.44 In the Atlantic, 
South Carolina was in danger from piracy. After the end of the War of Spanish 
Succession in 1713, known as Queen Ann’s War in the colonies, privateers turned to 
piracy and attacked all forms of trade along the North American coast.45  
The more recent scholarly works on the history of South Carolina discuss the 
proprietary government period as a time of complex struggle for the control of the 
colony. Historians agree that three groups were engaged in this struggle to include the 
colonist (mostly the elite planter class), the proprietors of the colony, and the Board of 
Trade. The colonists would rebel in 1719 and choose the Board of Trade as the body that 
should make decisions for the colony. 46 In exploring this history, historians have focused 
on various explanations of the power struggle within the colony. M. Eugene Sirmans in 
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his work Colonial South Carolina: A Political History 1663-1763 and Richard P. 
Sherman in his work Robert Johnson: Proprietary and Royal Governor of South 
Carolina focused on the complex external problems to explain the struggle for control. 
These two historians concluded that it was the failure of the proprietary government to 
protect the colony against the Indians, other nations, and pirates that ultimately caused a 
rebellion in 1719. In 1983, Robert M. Weir support these historian’s conclusions in his 
book Colonial South Carolina: A History, with one alteration. Weir placed more 
emphasis on the threat of invasion from Spain, which he said was the spark that initiated 
the revolt in 1719. Hanno T. Scheerer published an essay in a collection titled Creating 
and Contesting Carolina: Proprietary Era Histories in 2013 that argued the reason for 
revolt was a conflict between the imperial merchant class and the planter class in South 
Carolina. Scheerer said that the “proprietors’ inability to protect their colony provided the 
backdrop for widespread popular sentiment against them” however, “the revolution itself 
was not a popular uprising against a neglectful government.” He concluded that it was a 
constitutional issue were the assembly rejected changes made by the proprietors to the 
constitution who had sided with the merchants in England.47 The events leading up to the 
colonies rebellion in 1719 underlined a complex set of perspectives that caused the 
colony to reject proprietary rule.  
These historians have explored the economic and political motivations of the 
South Carolinians, but they have largely ignored the motivations of pirates. In the 
historiography of South Carolina pirates have been discussed as actors that motivated 
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historical change and pushed the colony to rebel. This chapter will focus on how the 
events in South Carolina leading up to the rebellion in 1719 affected the pirates and will 
uncover their motivations. Ultimately, pirates attempted to set up strongholds in North 
America like they had in the Caribbean but their failure would make the Golden Age 
pirate more desperate for willing crewmembers, adequate provisions, and safe harbors 
because they were no longer welcomed in colonies like South Carolina.  
By the eighteenth century, a shift was underway in the locations where pirates 
found opportunities for plunder, shelter from weather, refuge from pirate hunters, and 
where they sought provisions, and repaired their ships. According to historian Mark 
Hanna the shift of piracy from the Caribbean to the South Carolina coast began as early 
as 1680 with the closing of Port Royal in the Caribbean.48 The pirate strongholds in the 
Caribbean originally included Tortuga, Port Royal, Providence Island, and New 
Providence Island, but by the early eighteenth century only New Providence remained 
under pirate control. In addition, the natural resources and geography of the Caribbean 
offered pirates the ability to find a haven even if they could not make it to one of the 
pirate strongholds. As was discussed in the introduction chapter, upwards of nine pirate 
hideouts across the Caribbean allowed pirates to hunt turtles for food while they repaired 
their ships using resources they found on secluded beaches. These locations helped 
enhance pirate operations during the seventeenth century, but by the early eighteenth 
century the resources were exhausted and powerful nations pushed the pirates from their 
hunting grounds in the Caribbean.49 Therefore, pirates sought new strongholds and 
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hideouts along the North American coast from which to continue their operations, and at 
least geographically the ones they found shared some characteristics of the locations in 
the Caribbean.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cape Fear River and the Pamlico Sound. James Wimble, “Chart of his 
Majesties Province of North Carolina,” North Carolina Map Data Base, accessed 2 
December 2017, http://dc.lib.unc.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/ncmaps/id/647/rec/ 
 
Pirate hideouts along the North American coast were in some ways similar to the 
ones from the previous century in the Caribbean, but the new locations did not always 
allow pirates the same flexibility. The Cape Fear River in North Carolina fit the 
characteristics that made it an acceptable location for pirates, and therefore it was not 
surprising that it happened to be a significant hideout for pirates and outlaws from 1717 
up until 1727(see Figure 1).50 In the early eighteenth century, the Cape Fear River was 
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inhabited by Indian tribes, and would not be settled by European colonists until 1726. In 
fact, at the turn of the eighteenth century the majority of the Carolina coast was sparsely 
populated by both Indians and European colonists alike. Some Indians villages were 
estimated to hold upwards of 500 houses, but great distances existed between the villages 
with only about 20,000 Indians throughout the entire region.51 The majority of European 
in South Carolina colonist settled in Charlestown with small groups of planters spread 
throughout the region. In North Carolina most of the American colonies were centered on 
the Pamlico Sound in the middle of the regions coastline.52 With the absence of American 
colonies near the Cape Fear River pirates would not have had to worry about colonists 
reporting their operations to the local government. The Cape Fear River thus offered 
pirates the ability to careen and repair their ship and gather a limited amount of resources 
away from the prying eyes of the American colonies.53 It seems likely that pirates also 
traded with the native tribes along the Cape Fear River for provisions, but no historical 
documents exist to support this conclusion.  Since pirates were forced to mostly forage 
for their provisions along the Cape Fear River, the natural limitations hindered the 
pirates’ ability to gather enough food to support themselves for extended periods. This 																																																																																																																																																																					
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problem was not something pirates had had to contend with when they were based in the 
Caribbean because they had turtles to eat and multiple pirate strongholds to return to until 
they were pushed out of the Caribbean.  
As previously mentioned, in the Caribbean pirates would combine the process of 
careening their vessels with hunting resources, but the unique characteristics of the North 
American coast offered varying degrees of flexibility and resources to the pirates. Peter 
Galvin argued that pirates’ success in the Caribbean was in part due to the availability of 
a natural food supply found from sea turtles. Unfortunately, no such resource existed 
along the North Carolina coast, and therefore pirates would have had to rely on 
provisions captured from vessels or friendly colonies willing to trade with them. Another 
factor that affected the pirates’ flexibility in hideouts like the Cape Fear River was the 
more limited escape routes when being pursued by pirate hunters. A pirate vessel could 
be easily trapped in the Cape Fear River by one or two vessels blockading the mouth of 
the river as was evident at the capture of Major Stede Bonnet in 1718.54 In this way, some 
of the hideouts along the Carolina coast offered less resources and flexibility to pirate 
operations in North America. Another example was Blackbeard, who established his base 
at Ocracoke Inlet just outside the Pamlico Sound, a group of barrier islands surrounding a 
part of the coast of North Carolina (see Figure 1). Blackbeard has become a popular 
figure in the romantic discussion of pirates because of his tactics and persona. Blackbeard 
is useful in the discussion of pirate hideouts because his choice of bases and hideouts 
represented the locations chosen by most pirates who were active between 1713 and 
1726. The pirate base at Ocracoke gave Blackbeard the ability to observe trade coming 																																																								
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and going from North Carolina and resupply from the nearby friendly North Carolina 
colonies. Governor Charles Eden of North Carolina maintained a relationship with 
Blackbeard and supported his voyages from his base.55 The base also gave him multiple 
locations to careen and repair his ship using natural resources found on the coast. 
Although, this location lacked the food supply from sea turtles the pirates were closer to 
friendly ports from which to resupply. This location also allowed more flexibility in 
escape since the Sound had multiple exits to the Atlantic Ocean. These hideouts were key 
for enhancing pirate operations along the North American coast, but they weren’t enough 
the establishment of pirate strongholds was critical for the survival of piracy.  
From as early as 1680 to 1716 pirates attempted to establish strongholds in port 
cities along the North American coast. In the context of South Carolina, this struggle was 
interwoven into the changing political, economic, and social motivations of the colony. 
The group of pirates who attempted to establish these strongholds drew their identity 
from the pirate society of the seventeenth century, which was based in the Caribbean.56 
During this time pirates attempted to establish lasting bonds to the communities in North 
America, and into the early eighteenth century pirates found some success in turning 
Charlestown into a pirate stronghold. Pirates established dynamic relationship with local 
merchants, elite planters, and political leaders. These relationships revealed the process 
by which pirates attempted to establish a stronghold in the colony of Charlestown and 
was linked to the struggle for the future of South Carolina. Pirates were the fourth group 
locked in the power struggle for who would ultimately make decisions for South Carolina 
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which also included the local elite planter class, the Lord proprietors, or the British royal 
government.      
Local merchants welcomed pirates into South Carolina in the late seventeenth 
century because they brought in money and trade. The local merchants were 
representative of the elite planter class and the Lord proprietors because there was no 
established staple crop in the colony. Local merchants struggled to find outlets for the 
goods produced by South Carolina in order to make the colony profitable.57 Pirates 
offered some profitability because they were using the ports in Carolina to receive 
supplies, travel to the Red Sea, off the Indian Ocean, and plunder ships.58 For example, a 
1696 report written by Governor Robert Robinson of Bermuda to King William III in 
Britain revealed two pirate vessels that made a profitable voyage to the Red Sea. This 
pirate voyage landed a profit of “£1,400 to each private seaman.”59 If each ordinary sailor 
received what today would equal a significant score of £200,000, then the profit to be 
made by the pirate captains and other officers was even greater. According to the articles 
of piracy, captains were entitled to as much as two and a half shares of the plunder and 
the other officers received one and a half to one and a quarter shares.60 The half share to 
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the captain was often used to resupply and repair the ship if needed and a successful 
voyage allowed the captain to facilitate this repair and resupply through a friendly port. 
After the successful voyage, these two pirate ships returned to the Carolinas where they 
were “fitted out” for another voyage to the Red Sea, according to Robinson.61 Successful 
pirate voyages were profitable for both the pirates and the local merchants that supplied 
them with provisions, because the pirates could pay for these provisions instead of taking 
them by force.  
Reports from other local officals, both local royal governors and officials from 
Britain said that the reason that the Carolinas in the late seventeenth century were 
economically and politically accepting of pirates was because they were remote locations 
with a need for income. Governor Christopher Codrington the captain-general of the 
Leeward Island, also known as Antigua said that most of the pirates “generally find more 
remote islands and Carolina to shelter themselves in, rather than adventure themselves 
here [to Antigua].”62 Cordington implied that that only the Crown could put “a stop to… 
further piracies” in the Carolinas because the local merchants were directly profiting from 
pirate raids to the Red Sea.63  
Edward Randolph, who was a British customs official to the American colonies 
wrote a report in which he was attempting to expose the corruption of the colonial 
governments and lobby for more royal regulation described the northern part of the 
Carolina territory as a sparsely populated area by European colonists’ “under no regular 																																																																																																																																																																					
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Government. One Jarvis was appointed Governor by Colonel Ludwell, without salary.” It 
was for these reasons that Randolph said the colonists “were ready to harbour pirates.”64  
The small European population combined with the limited government made the Carolina 
colonies locations with limited regulations from the Crown and an excellent place for 
piracy to flourish. The Carolinas’ were a safe harbor for pirates because the local 
merchants and political leaders profited from the pirates by providing them with 
provisions and it was unlikely that they would willingly cut off any source of profit 
because of the lack of royal management.    
In the context of Charlestown, Edward Randolph declared that in fact the political 
leaders in the colony accepted pirates as early as 1693. In a report submitted in August by 
Randolph to the Commissioners of Customs in Britain, Randolph stated that, 
About three years ago seventy pirates, who ran away with a vessel from 
Jamaica, came to Charleston with a vast quantity of gold from the Red 
Sea. They were entertained, and had liberty to stay or go to any other 
place.65  
 
 According to Randolph, the pirates who came into Charlestown in 1693 were not just 
given liberty to come and go as they pleased, but were entertained. Randolph was not 
saying that the pirates were simply tolerated by the government, but that they were 
welcomed with hospitality and treated as guests in Charlestown. Randolph was not 
present when these pirates arrived in Charlestown and so the level of hospitality cannot 
be known; but they were clearly not treated as enemies of the colony.  
Edward Randolph went on to say that in apparent contradiction the government of 
South Carolina, after letting the pirates go, seized their vessel and sold it without alerting 																																																								
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the Crowns appointed tax collector. Randolph said that Mr. John Archdale, who was the 
governor of the colony of Charlestown with the permission of the proprietors knowingly, 
violated the “Acts of Trade” for profit when they seized and sold the pirate vessel.66 
Pirates may have been given liberty in the colony, but they could not leave without giving 
the government a share. The government taking a share from pirates was not unlike the 
prize courts held by governments when privateers returned after plundering. The point of 
a prize court was to determine what cut of the plunder the government would take for 
issuing a commission to the privateers.67 What South Carolina did was like a non-official 
form of prize court with pirates rather than privateers. Through Randolph’s reports he 
ultimately connected the political leadership in Charlestown to both accepting socially 
and directly profiting from pirates.  
Based on the evidence provided at the turn of the eighteenth century pirates had 
turned the Charlestown colony into a pirate stronghold, but political and economic 
interests would change as the new century dawned. In Charlestown, and other parts of the 
Carolinas, piracy was politically, economically, and social acceptable. Pirates could come 
and go as they pleased and expect a modicum of social acceptance when they brought in 
trade. According to third party observations the political leaders, planter elite, and the 
Lord proprietors of the colony sheltered, supplied, entertained, and directly profited from 
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piracy before the turn of the eighteenth century.68 Ultimately, pirates were welcomed into 
Carolina communities because they brought in money and the colony at Charlestown was 
well on its way to being a lasting pirate stronghold.  
Into the eighteenth century, political and economic interests began to shift and the 
different groups in the Carolinas became unreliable or outright enemies of pirates. The 
political acceptability of dealing with pirates in South Carolina from 1700 - 1717 
appeared to rest with the Governor, but the turnover rate created an inconsistent political 
climate. This frequent turnover was unique to the governors in the eighteenth century and 
it exposed a complex struggle for political control. Between 1700 and 1717 the colony 
had seven governors with five being appointed by the proprietors and only two appointed 
by the Council of South Carolina. Carolinas Governors willingness to do business with 
pirates somewhat depended on which group they decided to side with in the struggle for 
control of South Carolina. By about 1718 piracy in the colony was no longer politically 
acceptable. 
James Moore was the temporary governor of South Carolina from 1700 to 1703 
and during that time he was known for supporting and dealing with pirates. The 
Charlestown council appointed Moore as governor in 1700, but the Lord Proprietors 
never gave him an official commission.69 Governor Moore believed that the close 
proximity of South Carolina to the Spanish Empire allowed him to take less than legal 
methods to protect the colony. In 1702, the Spanish Empire threated the colony of South 
Carolina because they were known to support piracy, and the intelligence was provided to 
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the Governor by pirates.70 Governor Moore preemptively attacked the Spanish town of 
Saint Augustine at the beginning of the War of Spanish Succession because of their 
threats. One critic of the decision to attack the Spanish was from a man named John Ash 
who said that it was “a Project of Freebooting under the specious Name of War,… with 
hopes of mighty Plunder.”71Moore’s attack failed, but his motivations for it showed an 
eagerness to protect piracy in the colony.  Piracy was a part of South Carolina at the turn 
of the eighteenth century and Moore wanted to protect it.  
Ultimately, by 1717 the incoming Governor Robert Johnson saw the pirates as a 
threat to the stability of the colony and petitioned the Board of Trade to send ships to 
protect the Carolina coast.72 When Johnson took office as Governor in 1717, piracy had 
become an economic burden to the colony. Gov. Johnson sided with the proprietors in 
England, but he was frustrated that neither the Board of Trade or the proprietors would 
answer his request for assistance against the pirates. By 1718, no ships were sent from 
England to assist the colony and so Johnson sent two vessels after a group of pirates 
reported to be hiding in the Cape Fear River. Immediately after the voyage returned 
successfully with a group of pirates to stand trial Gov. Johnson personally led another 
expedition to capture pirates.73 Both privately funded pirate hunts showed that the 
political acceptance of piracy in the colonies was over by 1718. Pirates would continue to 
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operate along the North American coast, but they would find the colonies in South 
Carolina no longer politically willing to accept them.                   
 Shifting away from the political aspects, the acceptance of piracy based on 
economic terms was through the slave trade, and pirates’ had relationships with the elite 
planter class in South Carolina. Gregory E. O’Malley used the intercolonial slave trade 
into the eighteenth century to explain the relationships pirates and smugglers had with the 
elite planter class in North America.74 Into the eighteenth century the economic interests 
of many of the North American colonies relied on the slave trade, but the trade was 
highly variable and so many groups in the American colonies turned to pirates, 
privateers, and smugglers to increase slave imports. In the early eighteenth century, the 
American colonies were not directly connected to the transatlantic slave trade. Pirate 
enterprises and illicit traders delivered slaves to the fledgling colonies in North America 
because no legitimate network of slave trading to the American colonies was established 
until the mid-eighteenth century. The Caribbean was the hub of the slave trade and the 
North American British colonies were on the fringes. Therefore, between 1670 and 1730 
the American colonies received their slaves from pirates, privateers, and smugglers. The 
reason for the acceptability of the illicit slave trade to the northern British colonies was 
that it allowed them to increase their colony’s size and compete with the other nations, 
such as Spain and Portugal, who were beating the British in colonizing the New World. 75 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, slaves were taken to ports in the Caribbean, 
and then some were transported to markets in the American colonies; however, the trade 
did not occur with any consistency. The conditions set by the unreliable official slave 																																																								
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trade to the American colonies forced the planter class to turn to pirates, privateers, and 
smugglers in order increase the growth and economic power of the colonies. 
The Board of Trade in Britain was aware of this problem in the slave trade to the 
North American colonies and their actions subsequently opened the door for more illicit 
trade. In 1698, British Parliament opened the African slave trade to traders who were not 
a part of the Royal African Company.76 This opened the slave trade to the American 
colonies significantly by allowing non-Royal African Company ships to transport and sell 
slaves and this permitted those smuggling slaves to have more legitimacy and operate 
more freely. The Board of Trade likely opened the slave trade because they knew no 
direct slave routes between African and the American colonies existed, and they knew 
that the colonists were likely importing slaves illegally. The Board of Trade most likely 
supported these endeavors to increase the economic productivity of colonies South 
Carolina because it was these types of colonies that financially supported England.77 
Charlestown, South Carolina exploited this reduced regulation and turned to pirates, 
privateers and smugglers to increase the slave trade to their colony.    
The elite planter class in Charlestown took advantage of the reduced regulations 
on the slave trade to increase their slave import through the black market in order to 
increase their economic power. The planter class in Charlestown Carolina encouraged the 
slave trade through this black market from about 1704 to 1714, which assisted with the 
growth of the port at Charlestown. Ports in South Carolina in the first few years of the 
eighteenth century, especially Charlestown, were not very populated and were considered 
backwater ports. According to historian George O’Malley, South Carolina in 1704 was 																																																								
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the perfect location “where slaveholders looked to the black-market to obtain workers.”78 
The War of Spanish Succession coupled with the Navigation Act of 1696 and South 
Carolina’s rice being used for British Naval stores increased the need for slaves in the 
colony. The War of Spanish Succession, which began in 1703, proved to be a benefit for 
the South Carolina colony because the British Navy required significant provisions of 
rice. As a result two new ports at Beaufort and Port Royal Sound were created in 1711 to 
keep up with export and production.79 The combination of war, acceptability of illicit 
trade, and the opportunity for economic growth provided the mixture that led to the rise 
of slave imports into South Carolina from 1704 to 1714. These circumstances allowed the 
elite planter class to increase slave imports though unofficial means while still 
maintaining legitimacy and building economic power through trade in the port of 
Charlestown.   
Primary sources do not exist that explicitly say the elite planter class was dealing 
with pirates, but a look at the official imports of slaves into South Carolina showed that 
the colony was receiving slaves from pirates, privateers, and smugglers. The number of 
slaves recorded as imports into South Carolina from 1703 to 1708 was far below the 
actual numbers, indicating that the colony was receiving slaves from unofficial channels. 
Based on some of the figures provided by Randolph and other colonial officials the 
Negro population in South Carolina in 1703 was about 3,250, but had grown to 4,100 by 
1708.80 In those years, less than 400 slaves were on record as officially imported into the 
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colony.81 Based on these estimates, the Negro slave population grew by 850 during this 
six-year period, which suggested that almost 450 slaves were illegally imported into the 
colonies between 1703 and 1708. These figures indicated that South Carolina was at the 
very least dealing with smugglers. Randolph then sent multiple reports of pirate activities 
and slave trading figures to the Crown and the Carolina proprietors until his death in 
1703.82 The reports by Randolph combined with the figures of slave imports showed that 
it was more than likely the Carolinas were dealing with pirates to increase their slave 
imports. 
By 1714, however, pirates, privateers, and smugglers were no longer a benefit to 
the elite planter class in Charlestown. Shifting economic interests caused the planters to 
become an unreliable trade partner with the pirates. In 1710, the first documented direct 
voyage from Africa to the South Carolina was recorded and over the next decade direct 
voyages would become more consistent.83  By the end of the war in 1713, the port of 
Charlestown was no longer a backwater port and so by 1714 it was not surprising that it 
no longer looked to the black-market to acquire slave labor. After 1714, the import of 
slaves dropped from 419 that year, to less than 100 a year until 1717 due to financial 
troubles in the colonies. Then in 1717, the slave trade resumed under more consistent and 
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legitimate circumstances averaging about 472 a year until 1724.84 Pirates usefulness to 
the planter class in South Carolina degraded after 1714 in part because they no longer 
needed as many slaves to support their industry and in part because direct voyages 
occurred more frequently from Africa. The use of pirates for these black market dealings 
contributed to an increase in pirate activity along the North American coast; however this 
pirate activity did not decrease after the planter class stopped being a reliable trade 
partner with the pirates.    
By 1716, piracy along the Carolina coast had increased to a point where what 
remained of the elite planter class became an enemy to pirates which signaled that 
Charlestown had more to fear from pirates than to gain. The decrease in black market 
trade to South Carolina occurred almost simultaneously with the increase in pirate 
activity along the North American Coast in 1715 due to the Spanish treasure fleet 
wrecks.85 In 1716, Charlestown was going through economic and territorial difficulties 
from the Yamasee War with the Native Americans, staggering debt, and a significant 
drop in rice production and export.86 Due to the problems in South Carolina and the 
increase in pirate activity along the coast of the colony the elite planter and imperial 
merchant classes became more fearful of pirates and saw them as a threat to the long term 
economic stability of the colony. This fear was because pirates along the South Carolina 
coast were targeting the only lifeline reaming for the colony, which was their trade with 
Britain.87 The changing economic interests of the elite planter class and the rising 
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presence of pirates along the coast turned pirates into an outright enemy of the colony’s 
economic interests. Thus by 1717, the political and economic interests of Charlestown 
were no longer aligned with pirates, and as a result the colony was no longer a pirate 
stronghold.  
The British Board of Trade, the King of England, and the Lord Proprietors of the 
colony of South Carolina attempted to suppress piracy through legal measures throughout 
the eighteenth century, but the attempts exposed a controversial debate at the time.  
However, in 1717 the colony of Charlestown, South Carolina was not yet willing to 
directly combat the pirate threat or go to war with the pirates. This hesitation would 
complicate matters when the Lord proprietors attempted to remove the pirates through 
legal means. The legal situation was unique in South Carolina because it was a privately 
owned colony and so had no official royal commission. The struggle for the ultimate 
control of South Carolina played a role in in the legal battle against pirates. From the 
perspective of the Board of Trade and the Crown, piracy was a problem in the American 
colonies during the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century. In 1700, the 
Board of Trade pushed an act through the British parliament at the behest of the King 
titled the “Act for the more effectual Suppression of Piracy,” which superseded the 1536 
“Offences at Sea Act” for the prosecution of piracy.88 The two acts exposed an ongoing 
debate between whose interests should be served in the prosecution of pirates.   
The common law which was favored under the 1536 act served the interests of 
local judges and colonists, but the 1700 took was under the civil law and took away these 
groups legal power. The term colonists is inherently ambiguous because the juries in each 
case could have been a mixture of elite and non-elite colonists, and without a detailed 																																																								
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look at the juries in each case, identification of their statues cannot be determined. 
Therefore, the term colonists simply referred to a combination of general local interests. 
On one side of the debate was the advocates for the common law, and this group was 
made up of the local judges both in England and the American colonies. The common 
law was unique in that the local judges developed their own interpretations of the law and 
specific customs depending on where they served. The common law gave local judges the 
power to determine how to prosecute pirates based on how they challenged local 
community affairs. On the other side of the debate was the advocates for civil law, which 
included the Admiralty, imperial merchants, and local elites who were connected to 
international trade. The civil law was different from common law because it replaced the 
local judge with an Admiral concerned with maritime law and the protection of the sea. 
Civil law was also different because it did not conform to local customs of law and it 
favored the royal interests over the local.89 The 1700 act removed the power from the 
local judges but it also took legal power away from American colonists who served on 
juries.   
These two acts essentially changed the structure of the jury and the 1700 was 
more suited to serve the interests of the Board of Trade in England.  According to the 
1536 Piracy Act, the jury was comprised of local citizens from the district in which the 
trial was held with power to render a guilty or not-guilty verdict. On the other hand, the 
jury according to the 1700 Piracy Act was comprised of a seven-man council made up of 
naval officers, government officials, and merchants. The act limited the membership of 
the council to these groups of men because they all owed their position to royal posting 
and were therefore easier to influence. The difference between piracy courts held under 																																																								
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the 1700 Act and other British courts was the replacement of an impartial jury for the 
seven-member council with greater imperial bias. This council acted as “investigator, 
indicter, judge, and jury” to those accused of piracy and they held almost absolute power 
over the outcome of any trial.90 The Board of Trade was trying to gain more legal control 
over the American colonies through the implementation of the 1700 Act. However, since 
the colonies in South Carolina were privately owned the proprietors could choose if they 
wanted to prosecute pirates.  
Table 1.  Execution Rate of Pirates in New World Colonies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*23 pirates executed according to newspaper articles, but no trial documents exist. 
 
In 1716, the proprietors made the choice to begin prosecuting pirates, which 
would send a clear message overtime that pirates were no longer welcome in South 
Carolina and that Charlestown was no longer a pirate stronghold. Based on a broad look 
at the four trials held in Charlestown of the 71 sailors tried for piracy there were 55 found 
guilty, and out of those found guilty 49 were executed.91 That was a 69% execution rate 
for the colony of Charlestown, which was the highest rate in the American colonies when 
compared to other locations that held pirate trials like Newport, Rhode-Island and 
Boston, Massachusetts (see Table 2). In 1718, the colony executed 46 pirates within a 
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Location of Colony # Of Trials 
On 
Trial Executed 
Execution 
Rate 
Charles Town, South Carolina 3 71* 49 69% 
Boston, Massachusetts Bay, New-England 4 46 16 35% 
New Providence, Bahama Islands, City of Nassau 1 10 8 80% 
St. Jago de la Vega (Spanish Town), Jamaica 1 29 21 75% 
Newport, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations 2 46 26 57% 
Total 11     202 120 63% 
		
	 	
53	
month of each other, the largest number of pirates executed in any one colony. Some of 
the pirate bodies were even hung at White Point to intimidate other pirates.92 By 1718, it 
was clear that any lingering doubt held by the Board of Trade in England about 
Charlestown harboring pirates was gone and the message was clear to all pirates as well 
that it was no longer safe to attempt to turn Charlestown into a pirate stronghold as long 
as the English controlled the colony. 
South Carolina was no longer willing to support piracy after 1718, but through a 
local view of the trials, the decision made by the proprietors to prosecute pirates in the 
way they did showed a new dimension of piracy. In an effort to suppress piracy along the 
Carolina coast the proprietors of the colonies decided to prosecute pirates under the 
common law and the 1536 act, which among other things went against the true economic 
and political interests of the colonists. In 1716, the proprietors  appointed their longtime 
ally in the colony a man named Nicolas Trott to preside over the Vice-Admiralty courts 
in Charlestown.93 The decision made by the proprietors was an attempt to improve local 
relations, but by 1716 the elite planter class and the political leaders had advocated for 
more royal influence in the colony.94 The elite planter class and political leaders also 
wanted a swift end to the colonies acceptance of piracy. Nicolas Trott however, did not 
want to arbitrarily punish pirates unless they were guilty and he was the one who 
convinced the proprietors to commission for piracy trials to be held under common law. 
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Trotts ultimate goal was to maintain legal power in the colony’s, and holding trials under 
civil law would remove him as the one to preside over the Vice-Admiralty court. His 
actions were motivated by a rejection of the Board of Trade attempting to circumvent his 
local authority with the implementation of the 1700 piracy act. Even so, it was unlikely 
that sailors who Trott determined to be guilty for piracy would escape execution even 
with the presence of an impartial jury in his court room.95 In hindsight the right choice for 
the proprietors would have been to allow pirates to be tried under the 1700 act which 
would have served the interests of elite colonists and the political leaders who were 
advocating for more royal control of the colony. The decision made by the proprietors 
would turn out to have damaging results for the colony because it left the prosecution of 
pirates in local hands and painted a target on the colony of Charlestown.   
The first two trials held in Charlestown would send a message to pirates that they 
were no longer welcome in the colony and that if pirates continued to interfere in the 
trade along the coast they would be executed. Unfortunately, the first two trials held in 
1716 and 1717 did not have any witness testimony and therefore only the charges and 
verdict can be used in this discussion. The first trial was held in 1716, and the nine sailors 
accused of piracy were brought before a jury and found not guilty.96 This first trial was 
significant not for its verdict, but because it sent a message to pirates that Charlestown 
was no longer willing to tolerate pirates and any suspicion of piracy would be brought 
before the court. Then in 1717, four more sailors were brought to Nicholas Trott’s court 
and all four were executed for piracy.97 This trial made the message even more clear to 
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pirates that if they interfered with trade along the Carolina coast then they would pay for 
their piratical acts with their lives. The message was clear for pirates to find a new port 
other than Charlestown as their stronghold, but the colonies actions would change the 
tactics of pirates along the Carolina coast.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Carolina Colonies 1729. Herman Moll, “Carolina” North Carolina Map 
Data Base, accessed 2 December 2017, http://dc.lib.unc.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/ 
ncmaps/id/355/rec/9 
 
 
The two pirate trials in 1716 and 1717 signaled that Charlestown was no longer 
willing to accommodate pirates due to the changing economic and political interests, and 
piracy along the North American coast had to adapt to survive. In the summer of 1718, 
Edward Teach (also known as Blackbeard) and Major Stede Bonnet attacked the colony 
of Charlestown. Edward Teach used the mouth of the Cape Fear River, which was about 
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350 miles North East of the colony of Charlestown as a hideout and made his base farther 
north at a place called Ocracoke Inlet (see Figure 2).98 Due to the proximity of the colony 
of Charlestown to Blackbeard’s base and the fact that the colony had started executing 
pirates the colony became an opportune target. Blackbeard was known for visiting 
destruction “if any injury was offered to him or his companions.”99 Therefore, in June of 
1718, Blackbeard and his crew successfully raided several ships protecting Charlestown 
harbor, and they proceeded to hold hostages demanding a chest of medicine from the 
blockaded port. The details were complex, but Blackbeard and his crew made their 
escape with the chest of medicine after dealing a personal and financial blow to the still 
struggling colony. Blackbeard was an example of the violent reaction to Charlestown 
being closed to pirates.      
Ultimately, pirates had initial success in establishing South Carolina as a 
stronghold for pirate operations along the North American coast. The economic and 
political interests of the Carolina colonies in the late seventeenth century were aligned 
with pirates, and so pirates were welcomed into the colonies because they brought in 
profit. Charlestown was well on its way to becoming a lasting pirate stronghold, but into 
the eighteenth century the inconsistent political climate changed the colonies political 
interests. This change loosened the grip pirates had on the colony and by 1717 the 
governor of the colony who represented the political interests of the colony no longer 
supported piracy. In a similar fashion the elite planter class relied on pirates to increase 
economic growth and their power through illicit slave trading into the eighteenth century. 																																																								
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This reliance on pirates contributed to an increase of pirate activity along the North 
American coast and the growth of Charlestown as a major trading port. However, by 
1715 the planter class became an unreliable trading partner with pirates because of the 
rise in more legitimate slave trade from Africa. Subsequently by 1716, with the problems 
in Charlestown caused by the Yamasee War and the ending of the War of Spanish 
Succession pirates were a greater threat to trade with England. The economic interests of 
the colony were therefore no longer aligned with supporting piracy. Then in 1716, the 
proprietors attempted to suppress piracy through legal means which ended with the 
violent attack on the Charlestown colony.  
The initial success pirates had in turning Charlestown into a pirate stronghold in 
the eighteenth century contributed to an increase in the number of pirates operating along 
the North American coast. This increase was also caused by the pirates being forced out 
of their former home in the Caribbean because of more powerful nations that included 
Spain, England, and France who were protecting their transatlantic interests. This group 
of pirates along the North American coast also known as the ‘Golden Age’ pirate selected 
this region to rebuild the support network they had lost in the Caribbean. When the 
pirates’ effort to turn Charlestown into a stronghold failed they had no other location in 
which to escape, and so they had to adapt in order to survive. Pirates in the Atlantic 
World after 1716 would become more desperate for willing crewmembers, adequate 
provisions, and safe harbors because they failed to maintain Charlestown as a pirate 
stronghold.  
 
 
		
	 	
58	
III.  Piracy in Rhode Island, Boston, and Nova Scotia 
 
 
South Carolina was not the only place pirates attempted to establish a base. 
Pirates had some success before and after the turn of the eighteenth century in 
establishing a presence along the North American coast in places like Rhode Island and 
Nova Scotia. In Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, the national conflict, the ample fishing 
trade, and the lack of long-term colonies gave pirates a place to acquire volunteers for 
their crews and gather provisions. The lack of colonies however, left pirates with no local 
communities to build relationships with. A royal governor in Boston, Massachusetts, 
controlled the area around Nova Scotia. In Massachusetts, the royal charter and political 
stability in the colony left pirates as targets for legal prosecution. Pirates were not 
received well by the colony in Boston into the eighteenth century. In Rhode Island, 
pirates had initial success in turning the colony into a pirate haven, but eventually the 
colony expelled the pirates. Pirates were left with a recruiting problem, which they 
attempted to solve by plundering fishing vessels in the north for their crews. There was a 
change in the eighteenth century from pirates requesting volunteers to forcing more 
sailors to join the pirate crew. This was a marked difference from how piracy operated in 
the Caribbean. Pirates along the North American coast began attacking ships more and 
more for provisions and recruits. 
In the midst of pirates trying to turn Charleston, South Carolina into a sanctuary 
for piracy, a similar progress was occurring in Rhode Island, Boston, and Nova Scotia. 
The British Board of Trade was less interested in these areas from a trade perspective. 
The Caribbean and the southern American colonies was where the real economic interests 
lay. The North American coast was not a lucrative asset for Britain, even in the southern 
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colonies like South Carolina that produced a significant amount of rice for Britain. Until 
the cultivation of more lucrative trade in the south like indigo during the mid-part of the 
eighteenth century and cotton after the American revolution the North American coast 
was less critical for the development of Britain. Virginia became more of an economic 
asset to Britain because of their export of Tobacco, but by in large the Northern American 
colonies produced limited trade goods and were not seen as very lucrative economic 
assets for Britain.100  
Much of the North American coast was considered peripheral to the growing 
British Empire in the Atlantic in the early eighteenth century. In other words, trade in the 
northern American colonies was not critical for the British empire. Even so, some 
communities in this area were more dependent on external trade then others. Rhode 
Island was one such community and pirates made initial success integrating into the trade 
and into Rhode Island society at the end of the seventeenth century. Political leaders in 
Rhode Island made a show of attempting to suppress piracy, but ultimately they used 
pirates to support trade. In to the eighteenth century Rhode Island started to support 
pirates less after 1718 until in 1723 when they executed 26 pirates, which was the second 
single largest execution of pirates in the colonies.  
 As pirates moved to the North American coast they had some initial success in 
turning South Carolina, Rhode Island and Nova Scotia into willing communities, but they 
ultimately failed. It was not enough for pirates to maintain economic and political 
connections to one local community, but pirates’ needed multiple communities to 
maintain their influence. Pirates were able to influence a short-term economic deficit in 																																																								
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trade if the community was willingly working with pirates. Remember the example of 
Port Royal, Jamaica in the seventeenth century. When piracy was no longer accepted in 
the area they simply left and trade suffered causing the Governor to again willingly work 
with pirates. This strategy only worked because the pirates had another willing pirate 
haven to go to that had an ample trade network and was economically dependent on sea 
based trade. Along the North American coast, this strategy was almost not feasible in the 
eighteenth century.  
If the northern colonies were amenable to being pirate havens, then there were 
reasons for pirates to pursue a relationship with these northern colonies. One of the 
reasons there was not as much of a violent reaction from pirates, as in South Carolina, 
when piracy was cut from these communities was because the north was relatively 
economically isolated. This isolation would suggest that pirates would have desired to 
turn these northern colonies into strongholds, if they could, rather than plunder the 
mediocre trade. Rhode Island was however, more dependent on external sea based trade 
in the early eighteenth century than other northern American colonies.101 Prior to about 
1718, the general economic situation in the more northern colonies caused pirates to 
focus more on turning them into strongholds rather than significantly plundering trade in 
the area. Any victory made in turning these areas into pirate stronghold would be 
beneficial for pirates to recruit crews, acquire provisions, and influence trade in other 
areas. South Carolina had a good amount of exports and a need for imports that made it 
similar to the colonies in the Caribbean. Rhode Island and Massachusetts had a much 
smaller need for imports and limited exports until the 1730s. Pirates soon came to realize 
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that the northern colony’s had little to offer in lucrative external trade, but that they could 
leverage Rhode Island’s reliance on trade to gain some influence in the colony.  
Pirates were making a conscious effort to turn communities along the North 
American coast into strongholds by exploiting political and economic opportunities. 
Initially pirates had some success in the late seventeenth century in working with these 
colonies which kept piracy alive in the area until the beginning of Queen Ann’s War in 
1702. At that time the occupation of privateering remerged as national recognized and the 
illegality of piracy faded into the background of war. When the war ended in 1713 with 
the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht piracy began to remerge as illegal behavior. Pirates 
continued their attempts to maintain or build their relationships with local communities 
along the North American coast, but pirates fell into chaos when political and economic 
interests began to shift and pirates where shunned. Pirates responded to the gaps in the 
political and economic structure of late seventeenth and early eighteenth century North 
American colonies in a deliberate effort to turn these communities into pirate strongholds 
like they had in the Caribbean. Pirates only rarely made their intentions known in the 
historical record, therefore the way to explore pirates aim in an area is to observe their 
dealings and relationships with local communities. Since this played out markedly 
differently in different communities, I look at events in Rhode Island, Boston, and Nova 
Scotia.       
 
Rhode Island  
Rhode Island was an example of a colony that was politically accepting of piracy 
despite its geographic proximity to royal colonies opposed to piracy in New England. The 
		
	 	
62	
political relationship between Rhode Island and the British government was turbulent 
towards the end of the seventeenth century, which caused a strain on intercolonial 
relations and created an opening for piracy. Rhode Island was originally founded in 1636 
as a charter colony. The major centers of population, wealth, and government were 
located at Newport and Portsmouth. The relatively independent charter colony existed for 
almost fifty years with its people bound together by religion. In 1686, James II, the 
British Monarch, reduced Rhode Island’s government “to the statues of a county” under 
the control of New England lead by a governor in Boston, Massachusetts. Two years 
later, King James II was overthrown and the colony resurrected the old charter without 
British approval and under the nose of the governor in Boston. Rhode Island had success 
in pulling the colony back under the original charter government, but this action created 
an ongoing power struggle for control between Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and the 
British government.102 This political struggle for control had undertones of the struggle 
happening simultaneously in South Carolina.  
The colonial Rhode Island government was willing to resist when the British 
government began to “encroach upon what they regarded as their charter privileges.”103 
In fact, when it came to political and economic dealings Rhode Island was not always on 
the level, which earned it the nickname “Rogues’ Island.” For Rhode Islanders this name 
was not taken as an insult but as point of local pride to denote their ability to take care of 
themselves removed from other colonial and national interests.104 This struggle for 
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control created an opening for piracy to gain acceptability with the political institutions in 
Rhode Island. 
Deputy Governor of Rhode Island in the 1690s, a man named John Greene was 
notorious for his liberal issuing of privateer commissions, but despite his motivations for 
issuing them the open ended nature of the commissions built a political acceptance of 
piracy in the colony. Like a majority of the American colonies this practice of working 
with pirates, issuing privateering commissions, and holding establishing local prize courts 
unsanctioned by Britain started in the late seventeenth century. One commission issued 
Greene in 1691 gave the power “to annoy the enemy according to his Majesties’ royal 
commands… as shall at any time hereafter attempt or enterprise the destruction, invasion, 
detriment, or annoyance of the said inhabitants or plantations.”105 This commission 
allowed the recipient to attack any vessel they believed was or would ever be an enemy 
of the colony, and they were also not bound to any geographical location.  
Usually commissions denoted a specific nation to target like the commission for 
John Quelch in 1705, which allowed him to attacked “and make prize… of subjects and 
vessels of France and Spain.”106 Quelch was ultimately tried for piracy because he did not 
limit his attacks to the nations in his commission. Greens open-ended commissions would 
have been alluring to pirates because it did not limit attacks to a specific nation. This 
commission taken to its extreme could have been used to justify an attack on British trade 
to other colonies if the recipient had been so bold. No records exist however, to prove 
that any recipient of Greene’s commissions ever went so far, but the possibility would 
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have been very alluring to pirates. Overall, this type of commission was not common 
among the American colonies and it signified that Rhode Island was politically open to 
dealing more directly with pirates. Pirates who went to Rhode Island to receive a 
commission would have more free range to choose targets and still be granted legal 
protection. This willingness to grant pirates such open-ended commissions was the 
foundation that brought pirates to the area and enabled the pirates to enjoy some initial 
success in turning the colony into a pirate stronghold.    
The political relationship with pirates continued when Samuel Cranston became 
governor of Rhode Island in 1698, despite the increased protest of the practice by British 
High Court of Admiralty in England.107 In 1700, Governor Cranston deemed lawful a 
privateering commission that Greene had issued before the turn of the century. 
Cranston’s certification of the commission granted the holder the power to “take, slay, 
burn and utterly destroy his Majesty’s enemies’ vessels, goods, etc.”108 At the time 
however, England was at peace and by declaring this a lawful commission, Cranston was 
telling the pirates that he would be just as welcoming to them as Greene had. In some 
ways, piracy was even more ingrained in the political dealings with the colony under 
Cranston’s government. The main reason was that it should have been clear to the 
colonial governors, especially Cranston, by 1701 that granting privateering commissions 
and supporting piracy was not acceptable to the British government. Cranston however, 
decided to continually disregard the illegality of his commissions, to the benefit of 
pirates.  
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Cranston continued to support piracy even though the British Board of Trade 
continued to threaten Rhode Island. For example, two years before Governor Cranston 
was appointed in Rhode Island the Board of Trade sent several letters to the colony 
regarding piracy. The Board was concerned about the colonies actions in granting 
commissions and working with pirates. From one message in 1696, they made it clear 
“that no pirates or sea robber be any where sheltered or entertained” within the colony.109  
Cranston would have been keenly aware of these letters because the same year he was 
appointed governor an investigation was started into the colonial governments dealings 
with pirates. In a similar fashion, the Board of Trade pushed an act through the British 
parliament, in 1700, at the behest of the King titled the “Act for the more effectual 
Suppression of Piracy.” This act first declared that any person who “either on the Land, 
or upon the Seas, knowingly … aid or assist, … receive or take into his Custody any 
Ship, Vessel, Goods or Chattels” from pirates should be tried and receive the same 
punishment as the pirates themselves, which was death. The second, more pointed 
condition to the political leaders of the colonies was that any “Governors … or Person in 
Authority” who refuse to yield to this act would lose the “Charters granted” to their 
colony.110  
Colonies who had dealings with piracy were at risk of losing their local 
government altogether. These two articles in the 1700 piracy act were directed generally 
at the governors in the colonies. This act combined with the multiple messages from the 
Board of Trade sent directly to Rhode Island should have made it clear to the colony that 
Britain did not approve of piracy under the disguise of privateer commissions. Governor 																																																								
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Cranston however, continued to deal with pirates and when the war began in 1702 it was 
documented that he continued to grant commissions until at least 1705. Cranston granted 
his last recorded commission in 1705, but it was not likely he stopped issuing them all 
together because he would not outwardly turn against pirates until 1722. What was more 
likely was that he stopped allowing copies to make it into the public record, which 
suggested that his support of piracy most likely continued after the end of Queen Ann’s 
War.       
In the early years, Samuel Cranston’s strategy for the colony of Rhode Island used 
pirates as a way to accomplish his objectives. Cranston’s political strategy was to move 
out from under the control of New England and maintain Rhode Island’s charter 
autonomy. Simply put the government of Rhode Island would make it appear they were 
complying with the directives of the local British officials in the colony without fully 
making the changes at the colonial government level. One example was that while Rhode 
Island sent soldiers to help fight Britain’s wars, they would not allow a non-Rhode 
Islander to be in command.111 Another implication of Cranston’s strategy was that the 
opposite was also occurring with regards to piracy. In other words, the Rhode Island 
colonial government implemented changes to its legal policies to appear in compliance 
with the British government’s stance on piracy while not intending to suppress piracy.  
The most significant example of this superficial compliance was an act against 
piracy issued by Rhode Island in the late seventeenth century. According to historian 
Douglas Burgess the government in Rhode Island issued the act, and narrowed the 
definition of piracy so much “that it not only exonerated all Rhode Island pirates but 
redefined piracy itself.” This narrow definition supposed that piracy was more closely 																																																								
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related to treason and a pirate was one who sold their services to “foreign princes.’”112 
The significance of this act was that it would be the last, even superficial, act issued to 
suppress piracy in Rhode Island until 1723. This was a struggle between the local and 
national interests exposed by the issue of piracy. Cranston continued to risk relationships 
with piracy and in return British government would send hollow threats but do little to 
stop him.  
Unfortunately, the records do not exist to show that Cranston directly supported 
piracy between 1706 and 1723, but the policies and actions he made towards piracy 
between 1698 and 1705 suggest that he did. Nothing after 1706 would have significantly 
changed Rhode Island’s dealings with pirates and so it was more likely that Cranston 
simply got better at obscuring the truth from New England and the British Board of 
Trade. One example of the likelihood of this was a show trial of pirates held in the colony 
in 1698. Two sailors accused of piracy named Robert Munday and George Cutler were 
brought to trial in 1698 and ultimately acquitted of all charges. The town recorder when 
asked to provide a copy of the trial record to one of the attorneys said he “forgotte to 
enter it upon Record.”113 The Board of Trade also requested a copy based on an 
investigation into the colonies dealings with pirates, but the trial record was delayed and 
not received until almost a year later.114 This same type of obstruction continued through 
Cranston’s term as Governor until he turned against pirates. Subsequently, Rhode 
Island’s political support of piracy would continue at varying degrees until about 1722.   
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 Rhode Island’s support for piracy did not go unmarked at the time. Rhode Island 
was more dependent on external sea based trade in the early eighteenth century than some 
of the other northern American colonies, which created an opening for pirates to 
exploit.115 Edward Randolph sent a report that Rhode Island was trading with pirates at 
the end of the seventeenth century. In response to Randolph’s accusations in 1699, 
Richard Coote, the Earl of Bellomont and the new governor of Massachusetts went and 
inspected the colony and wrote a report, in support of Randolphs’, that Rhode Island was 
economically protecting piracy. The colonial elite held the economic power, however 
limited in the Rhode Island town of Newport. In general, what was considered good for 
the town of Newport was considered good for the rest of the colony.116  
Commerce in Rhode Island was focused mostly on local agriculture internal to the 
colony and New England with attempts made to increase exports. The drive to increase 
exports gave pirates the ability to influence the colony. Rhode Island developed trade 
networks slowly to the Caribbean with an increase in production of subsistence crops, 
livestock and shipbuilding, but it was not until about 1735 that it was able to even enter 
into some direct dealings with England.117 At the end of the seventeenth and into the 
early eighteenth, Rhode Island operated rather autonomously because of a rise of a new 
kind of pride in independent governance, which caused the colonies businesses to employ 
“risky expedients” in commerce.118 Needless to say Rhode Island did not have a major 
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flow of trade in the early eighteenth century, but the commissions issued by the 
governors stimulated trade. Pirates soon came to realize that that they could leverage 
Rhode Island’s reliance on trade to gain some influence in the colony. 
Between 1716 and 1723, Rhode Island had dealings with pirates on a less 
documented nature, but it still occurred until 1723. For example, a witness at a trial in 
Boston, Massachusetts in 1717 testified that pirates were still using Rhode Island in 
which to escape and find shelter. Thomas Gyrald was the Mate of a ship named the Mary 
Anne out of Dublin, which was taken by the pirate Samuel Bellamy and his crew off the 
coast of New England. Gyrald testified that a pirate named John Brown and several 
others were placed on the Mary Anne by Bellamy to command it. Soon after a storm hit 
and the ship was forced to run a shore to ride out the storm. The pirates left the captives 
on shore and continued on land “in a great hurry to go to Rhode Island the better to make 
their Escape.119 Another witness named John Cole said the pirates came to his house to 
rest and once “they enquired the way to Rhode Island” they “made great haste from his 
house.”120 Even by 1717 the colony at Rhode Island was still known by pirates as a safe 
place to escape and find shelter. Rhode Island’s sheltered pirates and this allowed the 
colony to maintain some autonomy from New England, but the colony would not always 
be as welcoming to pirates.  
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Since New England was not as susceptible to the disruption on their sea trade by 
piracy, it was not surprising that it took until 1723 for the colony to respond to the 
changing piracy threat through legal actions. Piracy had started to change after 1718 on 
the rest of the North American coast, when pirates were no longer able to use South 
Carolina and New Providence Island as pirate havens. The result was a more desperate 
and violent society of pirates with very few places left where they were welcomed. 
Governor Cranston eventually recognized the need to suppress piracy around his colony 
and he commissioned volunteers to go after pirates in 1723.121 
When the 36 sailors were brought into Newport, Rhode Island in 1723 after being 
captured, it was still not clear to Royal Admiralty court officials if the colony could be 
trusted. Nine men were appointed to sit on the Vice-Admiralty court board to investigate 
and judge the pirates and only two on the board were from Rhode Island to include the 
Governor and the customs collector. The rest of the men were appointed from the colony 
of Massachusetts.122 In the end, it turned out that the board over zealously prosecuted the 
pirates, which resulted in the execution of 26 sailors for piracy. About eight of those 
executed were most likely forced to serve on the pirate ship(see Figure 2). Based on a 
look at five other pirate trials from Boston in the eighteenth century this extreme 
prosecution of pirates was not evident in any of the other trials. Therefore, it was likely 
that the influence of Governor Cranston or the customs officer from Rhode Island pushed 
the courts board to these extremes. It was evident that Governor Cranston after 
commissioning pirate hunters and subsequently executing captured pirates that Rhode 
Island was effectively finished being a welcoming community to pirates.  																																																								
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Boston 
Despite flirting with piracy in the 1680s, Boston’s government never really 
supported piracy along the North American coast into the eighteenth century. The colony 
of Boston, Massachusetts was founded under a royal charter from the British government. 
In 1686, the Governor of Boston was given control of the Dominion of New England, 
which included modern day New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey and a small part of Maine. With the removal of King James II in 
1688 the colonies who were subordinate to the Governor of Massachusetts mostly went 
back to more independent rule. The effects of this subordination of the colonies lasted 
into the eighteenth century.123 In 1698, Richard Coote, the 2nd Earl of Bellomont arrived 
in the colonies with a commission from British Parliament to reside as governor of 
Massachusetts Bay, New York, and New Hampshire.124 The Earl of Bellomont was a 
major financial supporter of a privateer named William Kidd who later turned pirate. 
Bellomont supported Kidd in privateering, but when he turned pirate and the other 
members of British Parliament who supported him came under scrutiny. Lord Bellomont 
took a hit to his reputation in Britain for supporting a privateer turned pirate and he was 
sent to the colony’s impoverished, which caused him to mistrust them when he became 
governor of Massachusetts.125 One example was that Bellomont organized the plan to 
capture Kidd in New York.126 Another example of this was that immediately upon Lord 
Bellomonts arrival to the Rhode Island colony in 1699 he started an investigation into 
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Rhode Island’s support of piracy.127 The political rejection, notably from Bellemont, of 
piracy caused the colony to not support pirates into the eighteenth century. 
 Another reason pirates were rejected from the colony in Boston was the 
persistence of the Massachusetts Bay’s royal colonial charter and the appointment of 
Joseph Dudley as the new governor in 1702. Joseph Dudley was a political advocate for 
the Boston colonial charter starting in 1682 and a noted pirate hunter. He was ostracized 
however, when he actually advocated for a royal charter instead of protecting the 
independence of the colony.128 The British Parliament saw Dudley as a royalist and 
rewarded his loyalty with the governorship of Massachusetts Bay in 1702, where he 
replaced Lord Bellomont. Dudley held the position of Governor until 1715 and one of his 
main positions was putting an end to “uncontrolled sea marauding.” Ultimately he 
believed that piracy “hindered New England’s long-term prosperity.”129 Piracy was not 
supported because of Joseph Dudley’s position as Governor of Boston and the persistence 
of the Massachusetts Bay’s royal colonial charter. This lack of support to piracy 
continued until all of the colonies along the North American coast rejected pirates. 
 Since pirates did not find any lasting support from the colony of Boston into the 
eighteenth century, the trials of them were less politically contentious. In other words, 
South Carolina and Rhode Island were known pirate ports in the late seventeenth century 
and so when they eventually turned against pirates the agents of the courts made a 
statement with the number of pirates they executed. In Boston, on the other hand, at least 
four trials were held between 1717-1726 with 74 pirates tried and only a 35% execution 
rate for pirates (see Table 1). In Boston pirates did not find as much support in the colony 																																																								
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from the beginning and so the trials were less about making a statement that the colony 
no longer supported piracy.  
In colonies like Rhode Island and Boston, the support and dependency on piracy 
never reached the levels it had in places like the Caribbean in the seventeenth century or 
in other North American colonies like South Carolina in the eighteenth. The acceptance 
of piracy was minimally spurred on by the merchant elite’s desires for trade in slaves and 
other goods, which were only available through more illicit channels. In short, however, 
it was just not as economically advantages for the northern colonies to support piracy 
because their economies were not as dependent on sea based trade. Colonies in New 
England had little to offer on the world market and so they developed around an internal 
community based agriculture system. This system did not require a large work force or 
complex trading networks to sustain its production. Pirates may have been able to gain 
some influence in trade, but not enough to hurt the colony economically if they stopped 
their illicit trading.  
 Piracy was not forcibly removed from Rhode Island and Boston, like it was in 
South Carolina, but it was simply unwarranted and so trailed off starting as early as 1717 
because it was no longer useful. In 1717, Britain issued a proclamation for the capture of 
pirates that put a bounty on every pirate’s head to be paid by the Royal Navy. These 
payments were based on the quality of the pirate, and the proclamation read thus that it 
would pay  
“one hundred pounds for the capture of every pirate captain, forty 
pounds for the capture of every lieutenant, master, boatswain, 
		
	 	
74	
carpenter, and gunner, thirty pounds for every “Inferior Officer,” and 
twenty pounds for every “Private Man.””130 
 
In the northern colonies, it became more advantageous for local political governments 
and merchant elites to capture or turn over information about pirates then to trade with 
them. When pirates understood that they were not welcomed in the northern colonies, it 
did not immediately escalate into violence like it had in South Carolina and they did not 
abandon the area. Instead, pirates found refuge in areas like the Capes of Virginia and 
Nova Scotia because these locations offered pirates a modicum of safety and provisions, 
but limited to communities to influence.131 Pirates had failed to effectively turn these 
northern colonies into pirate havens because they could not be manipulated through their 
dependence on sea trade. 
 
Nova Scotia  
Nova Scotia was a place in the early eighteenth century for pirates to pray on 
English and French fishing vessels. Europeans and Amerindians alike sparsely populated 
the island in the early eighteenth century. A few English and French fur trading and 
fishing communities existed on the coast of Nova Scotia but they were more 
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independently organized, left ungoverned, and only seasonally inhabited.132 The French 
occupied two small fishing bases in the colony of Port Royal and Canso along with other 
small independent fishing communities in the region. The Mi’kmaq, who first inhabited 
the region, maintained a presence in similar small fishing and fur trading villages set up 
across Nova Scotia. English fishermen would set up small fishing communities as well 
around the region, but no English colonies would be established until the middle of the 
eighteenth century.133 The French and Mi’kmaq seemed to be on relatively amicable 
terms with each other because they sometimes combine forces to harass the English 
fishing enterprises in the area.134 Pirates, in the early eighteenth century, would ambush 
ships near Nova Scotia from the Bay of Foundry in the south to as far north as the 
southern coast of Newfoundland to plunder provisions and acquire recruits from the 
decks of fishing vessels.135 For example in 1720, the Boston News-Letter published an 
advertisement for a group of fishing vessels who were plundered in the area south of 
Newfoundland. The add was to inform the family, general public, and legal authorities 
that sailors had been taken as recruits of the pirates.136 This points to pirates using the 
area around Nova Scotia and Newfoundland as a hunting ground for crew and provisions 
away from the preying eyes of English colonies along the North American coast.  
The perpetual conflict in and around Nova Scotia and Newfoundland between the 
colonies controlled by France and England, along with the Mi’kmaq allowed pirates to 
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operate more freely. France and England fought over the territory from the mid-
seventeenth century to about a decade before the American Revolution. France was 
looking to create a monopoly of the fur trade in North America and was therefore not 
interested in creating lasting communities. The colonies that did exist under French 
control were not receiving regular colonists and were only established to control the fur 
trade.137 Britain was trying to enter the fur trade, but had to settle for exploiting the 
fishing in the area. The conflict in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland between the French, 
English, and Mi’kmaq made pirates a secondary concern for these groups. When the 
English discussed pirates around Nova Scotia and Newfoundland it was mostly in 
reference to the larger conflicts in the area, and it was almost an afterthought. For 
example, in 1714, The Board of Trade sent a letter to an English diplomat in France 
requesting consideration in having a “men of war be order'd every fishing season to 
cruize on the coast of Newfoundland for preventing the French to fish in any harbours, 
and from settling there.” The main objective for the Board of Trade was to stop the 
French from getting any more power or land. Secondary to the main object was the use of 
the men a war “for protecting the fishery from pirates, and preventing illegal trade.”138 
For the English the main concern for this area was the French encroaching on their land 
and resources. Therefore, piracy was not the primary concern of the nation’s fighting 
over this area. Pirates exploited the conflict to operate with more liberty because the 
attention of Britain was divided between them and the French.  																																																								
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The coasts of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were sparsely populated and 
loosely patrolled area for pirates to acquire recruits, collect supplies, and repair their 
ships. Nova Scotia particularly was heavily contested, loosely organized, and sparely 
populated region in the early eighteenth century, which made it an excellent place for 
pirates to operate. In 1717, Samuel Bellamy and his crew of pirates were cursing along 
the Virginia coast near Cape Charles when they took a vessel called the Agnis. The 
captain of the Agnis a man named Andrew Turbett, and a passenger, Robert Gilmor, 
reported to the governor of Virginia after they made their escape. Lieutenant Governor 
Spotswood of Virginia, in the hope of getting help from the Board of Trade in England 
with stopping the pirates, sent Bellamy’s planned movements as reported by Turbett and 
Gilmor of the Agnis. The two crew members reported that Bellamy “intended to cruise 
for 10 days off Delaware Bay, and 10 days more off Long Island.” After a few more days 
of plundering Bellamy “then designed” to continue up the North American Coast to 
careen his ship “at Green Island, to the Eastward of Cape Sable,” Nova Scotia.139 
Bellamy decided to use the capes of Nova Scotia to repair his vessel after plundering 
multiple ships, which meant that it was a relatively safe area for pirates to hide. Since 
however, there were not many colonies or long-term political structures for pirates to 
build relationships with, they only used this area as a hideout.  
Instead of using Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to establish community-based 
havens, pirates utilized this area as a refuge to acquire supplies and recruits from English 
and French fishing vessels. Pirates were not able to use this area to set up pirate havens 
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because there were only a handful of independent fur trading and fishing communities 
located on the coast with no significate colonies. After the turn of the eighteenth century, 
the area was governed by the Massachusetts colony in New England. The French still 
occupied the small colony at Port Royal and Cason, but a treaty gave control of the 
territory, at least temporarily, to the British.140 By 1712, England was aware of the 
potential for the area around Nova Scotia to become “a [receptacle] for pirates.” The 
Board of Trade in England commissioned a council made up of Admiralty Officers and 
other political elite to speak on the issue of removing some of the fortifications around 
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to save on maintenance costs. The council was clear in 
their remarks that if any fortifications were removed from the area it would become even 
more infested with pirates, and they would “incommode and disturb our trade and 
fishery.”141 The planned reduction of investments in the area showed that the Board of 
Trade did not think it was worth investing in new fortifications or colonies, even if the 
experts cautioned them from removing any of the existing ones. The area around Nova 
Scotia and Newfoundland was important for trade, but ultimately not for settlement.       
The coasts of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were important to pirates for 
plundering fishing vessels and supported the continuation of piracy along the North 
American coast. In 1718, Massachusetts (which held primary responsibility for Nova 
Scotia) caught and tried eight pirates who were known for raiding ships in that area. The 
governor of Massachusetts, Samuel Shute, complained that trials along with other 
attempts to suppress piracy did not have the desired effect of keeping the pirates from 																																																								
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plundering trade and fishing in the area.142 By 1720, more fishing vessels were being 
plundered in the area of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. A pirate named Thomas 
Roberts and his crew took two vessels in the area, one named the Samuel and the other 
the Snow Phoenix. An advertisement published in the Boston News-Letter even said that 
Captain Roberts and the pirates forced several sailors out of the Snow Phoenix to serve on 
their crew.143  The practice of plundering fishing vessels was carried on by pirates into 
1722 when Edward Low captured several fishing vessels and forced many sailors to join 
his crew.144 Another newspaper advertisement published 1723 in the Boston Gazette said 
that the pirate John Nutt captured a fishing vessel near Newfoundland and “did carry 
away John Filmore one of the fishing Crew.”145 Recruits and supplies captured in the 
areas around Newfoundland and Nova Scotia sustained piracy for a time in the northern 
regions, but this type of refuge was inadequate in sustaining piracy indefinitely. Pirates 
needed local communities with political structures and economic interests that relied on 
external trade. If a region lacked those characteristics pirates could still carry on for a 
time, but pirates could not hold much power without willing local communities.  
 
 
 																																																								
142 " Governor Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, America and West Indies: June 
1718." In CSPC, A&WI: Volume 30, 1717-1718. Ed. Cecil Headlam. London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1930. 264-287. British History Online. Web. 8 October 2017.  
143 “Advertisement” New England: The Boston News-Letter, Number 859, August 22-29, 1720, 
published in John H. Baer, ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, vol. 1 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007) 
324.    
144 “Advertisement: Province of the Massachusetts Bay” New England: The Boston News-Letter, 
Number 962, July 2-9, 1722, published in John H. Baer, ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, vol. 1 
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007) 326; Also see Flemming, At the Point of a Cutlass, 16-34 & 39-43.     
145 “Advertisements, Memorandum” New England: The Boston Gazette, Number 202, September 30-
October 7, 1723, published in John H. Baer, ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, vol. 1 (London: 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, between the late seventeenth century and 1718 pirates had some 
success in establishing a presence along the North American coast in places like Rhode 
Island and Nova Scotia. Pirates found temporary refuge in Nova Scotia because of the 
national conflict and the ample fishing trade. These characteristics of Nova Scotia and 
parts of Newfoundland gave pirates a place to acquire crew and gather provisions, but 
there were no local communities to build relationships with in this area. Pirates could 
survive for a time in areas with no local communities, but not indefinitely. In fact, Boston 
had a history of not being friendly to pirates. Rhode Island on the other hand, was 
amenable to pirates. Through the political and economic gaps in the Rhode Island caused 
by conflicts with England and Massachusetts, piracy was able to infiltrate the colony. 
Eventually however, the colony violently turned against pirates and they were expelled 
from Rhode Island. Subsequently with the failure in Boston, Rhode Island, and Nova 
Scotia to build lasting relationships, pirates were left with a recruiting problem. Pirates 
attempted to solve the problem by plundering fishing vessels in the north for their crews. 
The manifestation of this change to piracy was brought about by local communities no 
longer willingly supporting pirates. Pirates began to force more sailors off the decks of 
other ships to join their crews instead of requesting volunteers from a local population. 
The shift to forcing more sailors was a change from how piracy operated in the Caribbean 
before the turn of the eighteenth century. A new trend had emerged in the Golden Age of 
Piracy. Pirates plundered ships along the North America coast less for monetary gain and 
more to obtain provisions and recruits.   
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IV. Forced Sailors in the Golden Age of Piracy   
 
 
In 1721, a colonial merchant ship and her crew sat calmly anchored off the coast 
of St. Lucia. This island in the West Indies lay about a day’s sail north of the coast of 
South America. The ship and her crew had just made the voyage south from the colony of 
New Port, Rhode-Island and left behind the cold New England weather. St. Lucia most 
likely greeted the company with a refreshing island breeze and a warm sunny day while 
the crew went about their work on the deck of the small shipping vessel. With the relative 
safety of the island and the joy of reaching their destination, the crew may have been 
caught unaware when the notorious pirate Captain Bartholomew Roberts came upon their 
vessel. Captain Roberts and his pirate crew took the merchant ship, her captain, the first 
mate, and two sailors along with a myriad of untold items. These captives were held on 
board the pirate vessel for three days before the pirate crew made their purpose known. 
The pirates confronted John Daw, the first mate of the merchant vessel, who was 
described as “a man of short Stature, pretty thick and well set, and of a Light Complexion 
and fresh Colour.” Daw’s captors asked him if he would sign the pirate articles and join 
the pirate crew. Refusing to sign the articles, the pirates took a cutlass and drew the blade 
over Daw’s head several times. He was then tied bloodied to the mast of the ship and 
whipped almost to death while a pistol was held to his head. Eventually, he was subjected 
to “so much cruelty” that he was “compelled” under the threat of death, to sign the 
articles of piracy.146  
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Unfortunately, the story of John Daw ends there in the historical record, and no 
sailors from the pirate ship made it to trial. We only have this story because one of Daw’s 
shipmates, Benjamin Norton, escaped from the pirates and he published Daw’s story in 
the Boston News-Letter. Norton was trying to prove Daw’s innocence, but since he never 
escaped or went to trial, nothing ever came of it. As these stories multiplied into the 
eighteenth century, it became impossible not to believe some of them. With the rise in 
stories about forced sailors on pirate ships, it was no longer correct to assume that 
everyone on a pirate ship was a pirate. Ultimately, it changes our understanding of what it 
meant to be on a pirate ship.  
Before the pirates started to force more sailors to serve on their crews, recruits 
were obtained differently. In the seventeenth century and into the early eighteenth 
century recruits were obtained by pirates asking for volunteers from pirate ports and 
captured merchant vessels. Sailors volunteered for pirate vessels because they would 
often receive equal shares, better food, and less work.147 Another factor was the conflicts 
over the New World and increase in oceanic trade, which created a need for sailors across 
all the nations of the Atlantic World. When the wars ended however, sailors who had 
been employed in navies or on privateer vessels struggled to find work. These excess 
sailors collected at ports and sometimes at notorious pirate ports. In the seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries, pirates visited these locations or gathered volunteers from 
merchant vessels to fulfill their crew requirements. For example, Governor Samuel 
Cranston of Rhode Island said in 1708 that the colony encouraged their “youth to follow 
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maritime pursuits.”148 Before 1718, it was easier for pirates to find volunteers because 
they still had a connection to land-based communities willing to support them. 
Pirates lost their supply of willing crewmembers when they were expelled from 
local land-based communities along the North American coast. As pirates lost their 
connections to local communities they started forcing more and more sailors from the 
decks of the vessels they plundered. Local governments stopped supporting piracy 
(albeit, to varying degrees) between 1716 and 1722. This played out in different ways in 
different colonies. In South Carolina, once piracy was no longer politically and 
economically accepted, their expulsion of pirates led to violent retaliation. This, of 
course, led to a large number of trials, and it was these trials, which exposed the 
beginnings of the phenomenon of pirates forcing more sailors to join their crews. In 
Rhode Island, on the other hand, when pirates became too much a threat to trade, they 
were hunted down; this sparked a surge in pirate trials there as well. One such trial, which 
took place off the coast of Africa, exposed the scope of the change in recruiting tactics of 
pirates. This led to a more general recognition of the issue of forced pirates from the 
Vice-Admiralty courts, the local governments, and even the Board of Trade. These 
groups put in place legal measures to account for the change in piracy and separate the 
forced from the willing pirate. Pirates began to understand these measures and they 
worked to circumvent them by making every sailor on the pirate ship, no matter how 
willing, culpable to piracy. Pirates in the eighteenth century changed to combat the loss 
of local communities willing to work with them, and they became more desperate to 
survive. This change to piracy manifested itself as pirates being more violent, more 																																																								
148 Hanna, Pirate Nest, 353 concluded from a quote in “Cranston to Board of Trade,” Newport, Dec. 
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dependent on the community of piracy, and overall more desperate for sailors to serve on 
their crews.       
The main type of primary source documents used in this work was pirate trials 
from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. Other supporting information came from 
newspaper articles, advertisements, official letters, captive narratives, and other 
government documents. The trial records however, stimulated the bulk of the historical 
questions and arguments made in this work. At least, twenty-three pirate trial records 
exist published in various volumes with the dates of these trials as early as 1609 to at 
least 1738.149 The bulk of the trial records exist from the eighteenth century specifically 
1716 to 1726 and many were published for the public during the time. Countless, other 
pirate trials exist in the Vice-Admiralty court records in the archives of the British 
Maritime Museum in Kew, London, but an exact count is unknown by me at this time.  
Fourteen trials were reviewed for this work and these trials were unique thanks to 
the growing popularity of piracy among the public in the early eighteenth century many 
pirate trials were published with extensive testimony from pirates and witnesses. The 
uniqueness of the trials published between 1716 and 1726 showed two sides of the pirate 
story: one was the pirates perspective and how they perceived themselves and the second 
was how witnesses perceived the pirate on the their ships. The published trial documents 
were published of a popular audience with limited legal jargon and more witness 
testimony. At each trial a sailor accused of piracy between two to six witnesses testify to 																																																								
149 Volumes of pirate trials include Raymond Postgate, ed., Murder, Piracy and Treason: A Selection 
of Notable English Trials (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925); Johnson, Charles (Daniel 
Defoe), A General History of the Pirates,. ed. Arthur L. Hayward (London: George Routledge & Sons, 
1926); John Franklin Jameson, ed., Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923); Baer, John H. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 1-4 
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007); and E.T. Fox, ed, Pirates in Their Own Words: Eye-Witness Accounts 
of the ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy, 1690-1728 (Fox Historical, 2014). 	
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the accuracy of the accusation. Over the fourteen trials, there were 353 sailors accused of 
piracy. The abundance of witness testimony gave me the opportunity to find patterns in 
what was happening on the pirate ship, in colonial governments, and in the British 
government.      
The trial documents showed that the British government tried pirates in special 
tightly controlled Vice-Admiralty courts. These Vice-Admiralty courts were comprised 
of a seven-man council made up of naval officers, government officials, and merchants. 
The Vice-Admiralty in Britain limited the membership of this council to these groups of 
men because they all owed their position to royal posting and were therefore easier to 
influence. The difference between the Vice-Admiralty courts and other British courts was 
the replacement of an impartial jury for the seven-member council previously mentioned. 
This council acted as “investigator, indicter, judge, and jury” to those accused of 
piracy.150 Other agents of the Vice-Admiralty courts included the Advocate General and 
the head prosecutor who were responsible for explaining the evidence and legal matters 
to the seven-man council. The prosecutors were important agents of the Vice-Admiralty 
courts because some of the council members were just as ignorant of the law as members 
of an ordinary jury in other cases around the British Empire during this time. In most 
Vice-Admiralty courts, no one was assigned to defend the accused sailor or at least no 
one who was very competent or enthusiastic. These Vice-Admiralty courts were not 
explicitly tied to any formal court house but could be held almost at any location; in one 
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case, the trial was held in a Tavern and in another, 169 sailors were tried on a ship off the 
coast of West Africa.151  
 When a sailor was brought to one of these Vice-Admiralty courts and indicted for 
piracy, it meant that they were brought before the council and a clerk would read a list of 
piratical offenses the sailor was accused of committing. The sailor could then either enter 
a plea of guilty or not guilty to the acts of piracy; if the plea was guilty they were 
sentenced; but when the pleas was not guilty, their trial would begin almost immediately. 
A sailor found guilty of piracy could be sentenced to execution, the Marshalsea, or 
servitude in the Royal Navy.152 In some cases, a trial was too complicated for the Vice-
Admiralty courts, so the sailor would receive a respite and would be transported back to 
London to stand trial. Finally, if a sailor was sentenced to death they could hope for a 
reprieve or pardon up until their execution. This shows that an accused sailor could 
expect a multitude of outcomes depending on the progression of the trial. The previously 
discussed biased nature of the Vice-Admiralty courts would have the largest impact on 
the outcome for the sailor’s accused of piracy who stood trial in the eighteenth century. 
 Historian Hugh Rankin was the first to discuss the forced sailor as part of the 
pirate crew in his book The Golden Age of Piracy. Rankin claimed that only skilled 
workers like surgeons, carpenters, and cooks were forced to serve on board pirate ships. 
In later works historians like Peter Earl and Marcus Rediker estimated that a larger 
number of sailors were forced into service during the ‘Golden Age’ of piracy. They 
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argued that there was an increase in forced pirates sometime in the early 1720s. Earl and 
Rediker claimed that a lack of willing volunteers during this age caused the increase, but 
they offer little explanation on how these sailors were forced into piracy and how they 
operated on the pirate ship. Rediker also claimed that the probability of munity on board 
eighteenth century pirate ships increased when more sailors were forced to serve in the 
pirate crew. Mark G. Hanna was the last historian to talk about the concept of forced 
pirates in his recent book the Pirates Nest. Hanna argued that the shift of pirates staring 
to force more ordinary sailors onto their ships occurred in the early 1720s because the 
New World colonies were experiencing increased pressure from Britain to suppress 
piracy. Hanna said that pirates needed to be connected to a coastal community for fresh 
recruits, supplies, information, and a safe place to hide from pirate hunters. With the 
increased pressure from Britain, these communities stopped their support, which resulted 
in fewer volunteers for the pirate crew.153 Hanna does not focus on the actual forced 
pirate in his work. Instead, he looks at the more violent nature of piracy when it was 
disconnected from the land and he uses forced pirates as an example of that. It is my 
intention to build on what Hanna did and look at what the existence of an unwilling pirate 
tells us about local and national governments perception of pirates, pirate suppression, 
and the operation of the pirate ship. 
A Massachusetts man named Phillip Ashton can serve as a template for how 
pirates forced sailors to serve on their ships. Ashton was the captain of a fishing vessel 																																																								
153 For a chronology of this topic, see Hugh Rankin, The Golden Age of Piracy (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1969), Peter Earl, The Pirate Wars (London: Methuen, 2003), Marcus Rediker, 
Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), Mark Hanna, 
Pirate Nest and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2015), Benerson Little, The Golden Age of Piracy: The Truth Behind Pirate Myths (New York, NY: 
Skyhouse Publishing, 2016).  
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called the schooner Milton from Marblehead, Massachusetts. This vessel and her five-
man crew fished for cod within thirty miles of Cape Sable, which was on the 
southernmost coast of Nova Scotia. In June of 1722, Ashton and the schooner Milton 
were unaware that the Pirate Edward Low was operating in the area. When the weeks 
fishing was finished Ashton and his crew sailed into harbor at Port Roseway to rest. 
While the crew was resting, among a collection of other fishing boats in the harbor, Lows 
men rowed towards Ashtons vessel. Ashton and his crew were still unaware that these 
men rowing towards them were pirates until they climbed aboard the fishing vessel and 
started giving orders. Four pirates welding pistols and cutlasses took Phillip Ashton and 
one of his crew, Joseph Libbey, back to Low’s ship. In total Low took thirty to forty 
fishermen that day, but after two days he released all except Ashton, Libbey, and four 
others. Edward Low brought the six captives on deck and made them kneel before him.154 
The captives refused to answer Lows questions, which Ashton said “kindled our new 
master into a flame.”155 Low became increasingly angry when Ashton continued to refuse 
to sign the articles of piracy and join the pirate crew. At several points Low pointed a 
pistol to Ashton’s head and said if you will not “go along with me, I’ll shoot you through 
the head!”156 This type of violence may have been common when pirates attempted to 
impress skilled labors like doctors or carpenters in the seventeenth and earlier eighteenth 
century, but it was not common for ordinary sailors. Pirates were desperate for sailors to 
operate their ships.  
After some time of refusing Lows threats, the pirate crew tried to persuade Ashton 
and the other fishermen to succumb to the pirate life. Instead of threating the fishermen 																																																								
154 Fleming, At the Point of a Cutlass, 18-29. 
155 Ashton’s Memorial, as quoted in Fleming, At the Point of a Cutlass, 29.  
156 Ibid, 31. 
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with violence the pirates attempted to entice them with drink and “the strong allurement 
of the vast riches they should gain, and the mighty men they designed to be.”157 
Ultimately, the pirates were trying to say that their life was more rewarding then being a 
poor fishermen and more entertaining too. Captain Bartholomew Roberts said in a similar 
way that his motto as a pirate would be “a merry Life but a short one.”158 Ashton was not 
convinced by the pirates’ proposition and again refused to join with them.  
Before the pirates left Port Roseway an opportunity presented itself for Ashton 
and a few of the other fishermen to escape. The pirates had left their dog on shore after 
collecting some fresh water and two of the recently captured fishermen volunteered to 
retrieve it. Ashton tried to volunteer as well, but was stopped. When the two fishermen 
reached the shore they immediately made their escape from the pirates, and Ashton was 
blamed for the incident because he attempted to go with them. The remaining fishermen 
on the pirate ship including Ashton and Libbey were forced to sail with the pirates. The 
ones who escaped took out a newspaper advertisement in the Boston News Letter to help 
their comrades and explain how Ashton, Libbey, and the other fishermen were forced to 
go with the pirates even “though they pleaded as much as they dared to.”159 This type of 
newspaper advertisement was increasingly used after 1722 to establish the forced nature 
of sailors taken by pirates.160 
Ashton would become familiar with the hardships of remaining forced on a pirate 
ship. Low and the pirates planned to travel to the Caribbean by way of the Azores Islands 
nearly two thousand miles across the Atlantic Ocean from Nova Scotia. The trip across 																																																								
157 Ibid, 30.  
158 Johnson, History of Pirates, 244, 285-286; Fleming, At the Point of a Cutlass, 30-33. 
159 “Addvertisments” New England: The Boston News-Letter Num. 962, July 9, 1722, in British 
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the Atlantic following the trade winds would eventually take them to the Caribbean once 
they set out from the Cape Verde Islands back across the Atlantic. The initial gentle 
persuasion used by the pirate crew to convince Ashton to join them disappeared when 
they got underway.161 Ashton said “they used once a week, or fortnight, as the evil spits 
moved them, to bring me under examination, and anew demand my signing the Articles, 
and joining with them.”162 Ashton did the drudgework on the pirate ship to include 
manning lines, raising sails, standing the cold night watch, and cleaning the ship. Many 
other forced sailors eventually signed the articles and joined the pirate crew because they 
could not take the constant beatings and fear of violence.  
Ashton did not succumb to the pirates and continued in this manor until he made 
his escape in March of 1723. The story of Phillip Ashton did not end there and he would 
continue to struggle on a deserted island until he was rescued in 1725.163 Ashton 
struggled as a forced sailor for almost a year and was able to escape never signing the 
articles or being brought to trial. Ashton’s time as a forced sailor gave him a higher level 
of credibility then the sailors who were brought to trial and testified they were forced. 
First, he escaped from the pirates. Second, he did not have to write down his experiences 
to save his life from execution. Ashton serves as a template for the forced sailor on the 
pirate ship in the eighteenth century. 
Starting about 1716, national governments, including the American colonies, 
attempted to suppress the growing problem of piracy across the Atlantic Ocean, but 
colonial governments and the agents of the Vice-Admiralty courts would soon discover 
that pirates were forcing sailors to join their crews. In an effort to suppress piracy the 																																																								
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British Board of Trade in conjunction with colonial governors started by offering an ‘Act 
of Grace’ or pardon to any pirate that would accept starting in 1716 and going up until 
1718. At first, many pirates took the pardon including Blackbeard, Major Stede Bonnet, 
and others, especially around the Bahamas, but a majority of them soon returned to their 
piratical ways. Even though pardons failed to make a significant impact in the 
suppression of piracy colonial, officials like Woods Rogers continued to use them until 
1718.164 
Table 2.  Post 1716 Shift in Pirates Claiming Forced Status   
 
Other government officials across the British Empire however, started to 
commission pirate hunters to suppress piracy in 1716. Some of these pirate hunters were 
uniquely suited to capture pirates because they had been privateers during the War of 
																																																								
164 G. E. Manwaring, Woodes Rogers: Privateer and Governor (Nassau, Bahamas: The Deans Peggs 
Reseach Fund, 1975), 30-33; Cordingly, Pirate Hunter of the Caribbean, 156.  
Trial Name Year Location of Trial On Trial 
Claimed 
Forced 
Found 
Guilty 
Found 
Not 
Guilty  
Executed 
The Trial of George North and Other Pirates 1716 Charles Town, South Carolina 9   9  
The Trial of Francis DeMont and Others 1717 Charles Town, South Carolina 4  3 1 3 
The Trials of Eight Persons Indicted for Piracy 1717 Boston,  Massachusetts Bay, New-England 8 8         6 2 6 
The Trial of the Pirates at Providence 1718 
 
New Providence, Bahama Islands, City of 
Nassau 
10 6         9  8 
The Trials of Major Stede Bonnet 1718 
 
Charles Town, South Carolina 34             
27 
          
30 
4 23 
The Trials of Aaron Gibbens and William 
Bournal 
1720 
 
Sessions House, St. George's 2               
1 
        1 1 1 
The Trials of Captain John Rackam and other 
Pirates 
1721 
 
St. Jago de la Vega (Spanish Town), 
Jamaica 
29 10           
27 
2 21 
The Tryal of all the Pyrates, Lately Taken by 
Captain Ogle 
1722 
 
British Ship named the Swallow, Coast of 
Africa 
169 126           
91 
74 52 
Tryals of Thirty-Six Persons for Piracy 1723 
 
Newport, Rhode-Island and Providence 
Plantations 
36 20           
28 
8 26 
The Trial of Nicholas Simmons and Others 1724 
 
Newport, Rhode-Island and Providence 
Plantations 
10 10  10  
Case of John Rose Archer and Others 1724 Boston,  Massachusetts Bay, New-England 17 16         4 13 2 
The Trials of Birdstock Weaver and William 
Ingram 
1725 Justice Hall - Old-Baily 
 
3 3         3  2 
The Tryals of Five Persons for Piracy 1726 Boston,  Massachusetts Bay, New-England 5 1         5  5 
The Tryals of Sixteen Persons for Piracy 1726 Boston,  Massachusetts Bay, New-England 16 12               
4  
12 3 
   
Total 
 
353 
           
251        
         
212 
 
135 
 
174 
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Spanish Succession and knew the tactics of the pirates. These pirate hunters killed 
countless pirates and drove over 353 sailors to the British courts from 1717 to 1726 to be 
tried for piracy (see Table 2). It was when those 353 sailors testified, along with 
witnesses, that the agents of the colonial Vice-Admiralty courts and government officials 
began to realize the phenomenon of the forced sailor. Over the course of the decade it 
became more and more apparent to organizations in Britain like the Board of Trade, who 
despised piracy the most, that pirates were forcing innocent sailors to join their crews. 
One of the main reasons to believe that the agents of the British and colonial Vice-
Admiralty courts recognized that pirates were forcing more sailors to work on their crews 
was because less than half of the 353 sailors put on trial for piracy were ultimately 
executed. This was a low number considering that most Atlantic nations considered 
pirates an“Enemy of Mankind” based on their political and economic perspective.165  The 
agents of the courts, who were supposedly acting on behalf of the political and economic 
interests of the Atlantic nations, realized that not all of the sailors on the pirate ship were 
pirates.  
The colonial courts developed a set of relatively clear circumstances from 1716 to 
1726 to determine if a sailor was truly forced to serve on a pirate ship or just pretending 
to be forced to escape execution. The foundation for these circumstances came from the 
1700 British piracy act and evolved over the course of the decade.166 Based on the court 
records of twelve pirate trials accused sailors were judged guilty or innocent of piracy 
based on eight different circumstances. Each of these circumstances represented a 
specific action or inaction taken by the accused sailor while on board a pirate ship. The 																																																								
165 “The Trials of Eight Persons Indited for Piracy,” in British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed. John H. 
Baer, vol. 2 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007) 300.   
166 Rubin, The Law of Piracy, 362-369. 
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circumstances were as follows: the sailor took a share of the plunder; they helped capture 
vessels or carried weapons while on board a pirate ship; they treated captured prisoners 
poorly; they appeared to be active on the pirate ship of accepting of the pirate life; they 
signed the articles of piracy; they carried an affidavit from a former Captain that said they 
were forced to go with the pirates or someone had put an article in the newspaper that 
claimed the same; they talked about or attempted an escape from the pirates; and finally 
they were threatened or tortured by the pirates to join the crew and sign the article. On a 
broad scale these circumstances were developed in the court room, and evolved over 
time.  
The trials and development of specific circumstances can be broken down into 
two phases. The first phase was from 1717 to 1721, and was marked by a general 
skepticism of the phenomenon of the existence of the forced sailor operating on the pirate 
ship along with a stricter adherence to circumstances based on the law from the 1700 
piracy act. The second phase was from 1722 to 1726. In this phase the agents of the 
courts recognized the phenomenon of the forced sailor on the pirate ship, and sought to 
understand it in more detail. 
The witnesses who had a personal experience with pirates, and testified at their 
trials, helped the courts see the phenomenon of the forced sailor starting in the first phase 
from 1717 to 1721. In this context, by observing the actions of pirates, witnesses mostly 
decided the fate of pirates in the early eighteenth century trials. A majority of witnesses 
to pirate actions were former pirate captives who had personal encounters on the decks of 
pirate ships, and the captive’s contribution to the testimony, which varied based on the 
length and severity of their capture. The individualized nature of the encounters stood in 
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contrast to the political and legal experience that shaped the perspective of the courts. 
While these captives ultimately had different experiences, their testimony focused on two 
key conditions that spoke about the character of those accused of piracy. The first 
condition was a description of their treatment as captives and the second was a portrayal 
of the individual sailors emotional propensity for the pirate way of life.167 In simpler 
terms, did they look and act like a pirate?  
A look at the composition and length of captivity of the witnesses that testified at 
pirate trials can help better understand their perspective.  Pirates mostly captured officers, 
ordinary sailors, and passengers from sailing vessels across the Atlantic Ocean who, in 
turn, represented the majority of the witnesses who testified at their trials. These 
witnesses were either immediately released by the pirates or held captive for extended 
periods. Passengers traveling on vessels attacked by pirate ships were usually 
immediately released because they had no sailing experience, but those with special skills 
such as carpenters, surgeons and cooks were kept on board for long periods of time. Ship 
crews comprised of ordinary sailors are more difficult to generalize in this way because 
there was less consistency in their treatment. Sailors were often immediately released, 
held prisoner, volunteered to join pirate crews, or forced into service. This indeterminate 
nature made common sailors more complex when describing their testimony as 
witnesses.  
																																																								
167 Bartholomew Roberts, noted pirate captain, says that “a merry life and a short one” shall be my 
motto. Marcus Rediker describes the pirate life as search for plunder, followed by a search for gratification. 
Plunder was usually taken by as little force as possibly because pirates wanted to enjoy the fruits of their 
labor as quickly as possible. So after plunder came a search for gratification through excessive drinking, 
numerous sexual encounters, and all the vices of life. Pirates wanted to enjoy life in the moment, free from 
control, rather than save and suffer for a future they could not imagine, or more likely because they did not 
care about. For more information about the pirate life, see Rediker, Villains of All Nations, 10 and Captain 
Charles Johnson (Daniel Defoe.), A General History of the Pirates, ed. Arthur L. Hayward (London: 
George Routledge & Sons, 1926). 
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Captains and other officers of mostly merchant vessels made up the largest group 
of captives to be used as witnesses in pirate trials. By position, captains had an 
understanding of navigation and were usually familiar with the details of the waters in 
which they sailed or traded, to a lesser extent so did other officers. This was something 
the pirate crews were lacking because pirate hunters frequently forced them to move 
locations to avoid detection. Captains may have been kept longer onboard pirate ships to 
provide information on shipping practices and military operations in the area, but this is 
not expressly observed in the historical record. Captivity for longer periods was more 
likely because pirates were in need of experienced navigators, which is represented when 
merchant captains reported they were used as pilots to help navigate unfamiliar waters.168 
In this fashion, the groups of witnesses who were held captive longer could testify 
to the quality of their treatment as captives and the accused sailors’ emotional acceptance 
of the pirate life. While those groups who were immediately released could usually only 
speak on their physical treatment as a captive. The witnesses had a unique personal 
experience with the forced sailor on board the pirate vessel. Therefore, the captive as a 
witness was more likely to emphasize with the plight of the forced sailor and in turn 
testify on their behalf. The agents of the courts, on the other hand, operated from a seat of 
authority and viewed these sailors as less than human and more as a “wild & savage 
Beast, which every man may lawfully destroy.”169 An accused sailor could expect to be 
prejudged by the agents of the courts as soon as they set foot in the courtroom.  
																																																								
168 A pilot is sea faring terms is some one who helps navigate through unknown ports and channels. 
The term is still used today.  For account of a Captain who was taken as a pilot, see “The Affidavit of Capt 
Peter Manwareing” British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed., John H. Baer (London: Pickering & Chatto, 
2007) vol. 2., 380. 
169 “The Trials of Eight Persons Indited for Piracy,” in British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed. John H. 
Baer, vol. 2 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007) 300.   
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 In the first phase of the Golden Age of piracy the agents of the courts to include 
the Judges, prosecutors, defendants, juries, and councils were skeptical of the growing 
phenomenon of forced sailors on pirate ships. From 1717-1721 six pirate trials were held 
in the British colonies and these trials will be used to explain this initial skepticism. The 
trial of MAJ Stede Bonnet and other pirates in Charles Town, South Carolina was 
representative of the trials held during this phase. This trial was not held by a Vice-
Admiralty council, but with a Judge and jury. The significance of this trial was that it 
exposed a set of four conditions that would ultimately determine for the courts if a sailor 
accused of piracy was forced or not. In the Bonnet trial, almost every sailor who claimed 
they were forced answered yes or no to the following four conditions: the sailor took a 
share of the plunder; they helped capture vessels or carried weapons while on board a 
pirate ship; they treated captured prisoners poorly; they appeared to be active on the 
pirate ship of accepting of the pirate life. These four conditions were the easiest to prove 
with witness testimony. So in the initial phase of the phenomenon of the forced sailor 
these were the ones used to determine if a sailor was forced or not because the courts 
were still skeptical.            
The first condition the courts attempted to determine was if a sailor had simply 
carried arms while on board a pirate vessel. Somehow, if the court could prove a sailor 
carried a cutlass or wielded a pistol while on board a pirate ship it made them a pirate. To 
prove this condition judges and prosecutors made pointed statements like “you were 
always ready for an Engagement… [and] had [your] Arms always in Order,” or asked 
questions like “did you bear Arms on board?”170 An accused sailors or witnesses answer 
to these questions determined if they were a forced sailor or pirate . If a sailor admitted to 																																																								
170 “The Tryals of Bonnet” British Piracy, vol. 2, 343, 346. 
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this condition or if a witness claimed they fit these conditions, then they were a pirate and 
had almost no chance of being found not guilty. For example in the Bonnet trial 22 
sailors were found to fit this condition and all were found guilty of piracy (see Table 2). 
This condition was by far the easiest to prove because witnesses who were not held 
captive for long could testify to it.   
The second condition was to determine if a sailor accused of piracy ever took a 
share of the plunder. Acquiescence to this condition was proved when the trial 
prosecution would ask direct questions to the sailor accused like “had you not your 
Share?” or a more indirect question to the witnesses like “ did he never share?” A sailor’s 
answers to these questions did not carry as much weight unless a witness was available to 
testify of their behalf. Therefore, it was observed that the courts did not respect, or place 
credence on, the word of a sailor accused of piracy, nor is it argued they should.171  Even 
more, this was not the easiest condition to prove because only the witnesses who had 
been captive on board a pirate ship could usually testify to this, but a majority of the time 
the accused sailor would say they had taken the plunder under force. In the MAJ Stede 
Bonnet trial a pirate named John Lopez had sailed with Edward Teach, Blackbeard, 
before going with Bonnet. Lopez said he had not taken a share while on board Bonnet’s 
ship. Judge Nicholas Trott asked him “did you not share a little before you came to Cape 
																																																								
171 “The Tryals of Major Stede Bonnet” British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed., John H. Baer (London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 2007) vol. 2, 347, 361.; Witness testimony: The courts more often than not, relied on 
the testimony of witnesses to convict pirates. Pirates could not easily find witnesses to testify on their 
behalf because they were usually put on trial far from their homes and almost immediately after they were 
captured. Also, very little physical evidence was produced by the prosecution or defense in pirate trials 
from 1609-1726. Therefore, witness testimony was required to convict a sailor accused of piracy. For one 
example of this out of nineteen trials, see “The Arraignment, Tryal, and Condemnation, of Capt. John 
Quelch” British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed., John H. Baer (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007) vol. 2, 
257. 
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Fear…” with Bonnet? To which Lopez replied “Yes; but it was against my Will.”172 
Despite the circumstances for receiving plunder or taking a share the court qualified a 
sailor who took a share as a pirate. 
The third condition was met if an accused sailor treated captives poorly while on 
board a pirate ship. In the trial of Bartholomew Roberts crew, one passenger named 
Elizabeth Trengove, said a sailor named William Mead was “very rude to her, swearing 
and cursing, as also forcing her hoop’d Petticoat off.” Another sailor, in the same trial 
was accused of being “particularly cruel beyond the rest of the Pyrates.” In order to be 
found innocent of the poor treatment of captives an accused sailor had to have shown 
their willingness to protect those held by the pirates. One witness said that a accused 
pirate named Robert Lilburn had prevented a captive from having his ear cut off and he 
was “ready in serving anybody taken.”173 It was far more beneficial for a sailor who 
claimed they were forced to have a captive say something good about their treatment by 
an accused sailor, then nothing at all. When one or two witnesses testified to the same 
account that a pirate had been extremely cruel to them, then they were considered a 
pirate.  
The fourth condition was proved if a sailor emotional accepted the pirate life. It 
was usually only witnesses who were held captive for longer periods of time that could 
testify to this condition. If a witness believed that an accused sailor was a pirate, it was 
simple to prove them emotional acceptance of the pirate life. All a witness needed to utter 
was that a sailor was “an Active Man aboard” a pirate ship in order to almost guarantee 
																																																								
172 “The Tryals of Major Stede Bonnet” British Piracy, vol. 3, 351. 
173 “Pirates Taken by Captain Ogle” British Piracy, vol. 3, 112, 94, & 101.  
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the accused was found guilty of piracy.174 If a sailor was “Active” on a pirate ship it 
signified that they assisted with attacking ships, drank with the crew, and did things other 
than the drudge work.  
On the other hand, it was extremely difficult for a witness or an accused sailor to 
prove that they were not accepting of the pirate life. For example, Henry Glasby found it 
difficult to prove he was not accepting of the pirate life. Glasby was one of 169 members 
of Bartholomew Roberts crew taken off the coast of West Africa and tried on board a 
British Navy ship named the Swallow. One witness testified that Glasby said, “he had a 
great deal of sorrow for being among such a Company of Rogues, that he had acted 
among them with a great deal of Reluctancey.” A Lieutenant in the British Royal Navy, 
who was the second witness to testify on Glasbys behalf, said he knew him to be of “very 
good Character” because he saved a ship from being blown up after being captured by 
members of his own crew. The pirate crew for some unknown reasons elected Glasby to 
the post of quartermaster immediately after he saved the merchant ship.175 This election 
put him as second in command of the pirate vessel and apparently this upset Glasby 
because a third witness testified that he “several times expressed a Regret for it, that it 
was imposed upon him.”176 By Glasby’s reaction, we can assume that he did not want to 
be charged with enforcing the rules associated with the pirate life. Based on the witness 
																																																								
174 “Tryals of Thirty-Six Persons for Piracy,” ed. John H. Baer, British Piracy in the Golden Age, vol. 
3 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007) 185. 
175 Pirate Quartermaster: Had more power than quartermasters on navy and merchant ships. The 
pirate quartermaster was charged with maintaining order on the pirate ship by giving punishments. Also, 
lead the boarding parties. Pirate ship democracy: Historians like Hugh Rankin, Marcus Rediker, Gabriel 
Kuhn, Angus Konstam Benerson Little, and many others have descried the democratic nature of the pirate 
crew during the ‘Golden Age’ of piracy. This is represented in the many the articles or rules of the pirate 
crew that show up in the historic record. Typical aspects of these articles include rules about how to divide 
the plunder, which office positions should be elected by the crew (usually the captain, quartermaster, and 
boatswain), how the elections should be contacted and what other types of decisions should be voted on.  
176 “Pirates Taken by Captain Ogle” British Piracy vol. 3, 99. 
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testimony in this trial, Glasby exhibited sadness, fear, and defiance in response to being a 
part of the pirate crew. Glasby was eventually found not guilty for the crime of piracy 
even though he fit the first two court conditions by going on board prize ships and taking 
a share of the plunder. Even though Glasby held an important position on the pirate ship 
his actions in saving a vessel from destruction proved, at least to the witnesses, that he 
was not accepting of the pirate life.   
The agents of the Vice-Admiralty courts and the colonial governments fully 
recognized he phenomenon of more sailors being forced to serve on pirate ships in the 
Golden Age of piracy between 1722-1726. In this second phase, the majority of trials still 
favored the first four conditions, but four other conditions started to rise in relevance. The 
four conditions that rose in the second phase of the phenomenon of the forced sailor were 
almost not provable by witness testimony, except for one. The change was that in these 
conditions the courts had to take the accused sailor at their word. The conditions for the 
accused sailors were as follows: they signed the articles of piracy; they carried an 
affidavit from a former Captain that said they were forced to go with the pirates or 
someone had put an article in the newspaper that claimed the same; they talked about or 
attempted an escape from the pirates; and finally they were threatened or tortured by the 
pirates to join the crew and sign the article. The willingness to take the sailor more at 
their word showed that they were more accepting that innocent sailors were being forced 
to serve on pirate ships.    
The first condition in the second phase was considered more subjective because it 
came directly from the accused sailors’ testimony. This condition rose to the level of the 
four previous conditions in the trials from prior to 1722. In this condition, a sailor who 
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did not attempt escape from the pirates was considered to be culpable to piracy. Sailors 
began to attempt escape more and more and they attempt to prove themselves innocent of 
this condition by telling their story. On one occasion a sailor named William Williams 
said that he attempted “to run away from them but was catch’d… and receiv’d two 
Lashes from every Man in the Company as a Punishment.” Williams story is likely true 
because some the pirates he accused of doing this to him confessed. 177 Even so, the story 
did not save Williams from being found guilty and executed for piracy. In another 
instance a sailor named Thomas Stretton said “he would trust the Mercy of the Seas to 
obtain his Liberty, rather than stay" with the pirates.178 A witness named Thomas Castles 
who had served with the accused sailor testified to the same and Stretton was not charged 
with piracy. If an accused sailor did not discuss in their testimony that they had tried to 
escape from the pirates, then that sailor must be a pirate. 
 The second condition was the accused sailor failing to produce any type of 
documentary evidence to prove their forced statues. A sailor met this condition and was 
considered a possible pirate if they did not have an affidavit or a letter from a former 
captain saying they were forced. At other times, sailors asked fellow crewmembers not 
take by pirates to publish their forced statues in newspaper advertisement.179 If a sailor 
could not produce this document at trial they were considered more likely a pirate. 
A problem existed with a newspaper advertisement or affidavit being produced to 
prove an accused sailors’ innocence at trial and that was because it was static evidence. 
This type of evidence was only a snapshot of an accused sailor being forced onto a pirate 
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178 Ibid, 104. 
179 “Collection of News Paper Articles on Forced Men,” ed., John H. Baer, British Piracy in the 
Golden Age, vol. 1 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007), 323-331. 
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ship at the point of capture. A letter or advertisement could not speak to how a sailor 
acted while on board the pirate ship and so this was less beneficial to the accused sailor 
than other forms of evidence. For example, when Phillip Ashton’s crewmate Joseph 
Libbey was captured and brought to trial in 1723 he produced the newspaper 
advertisement that claimed he was forced. Libbey had not escape from the pirates and 
had even became an “active Man among them.”180 The advertisement, which had 
signaled, that Libbey, Ashton, and other fishermen who were initially forced onto the 
pirate ship did not account for their actions while on board. This condition proved an 
accused sailor was more likely a pirate if they could not produce any document providing 
they had been forced. Even when they did provide a document it was really their actions 
on the ship that determined if they were considered pirates.                
In the third condition, pirate captains wanted their crews to sign the ‘articles’ of 
piracy when they sailed with them under the black flag. The articles entitled every sailor 
to an equal share of the plunder, dictated how that plunder should be divided, and 
described the punishments for when the articles were violated. Forced sailors feared that 
the articles linked the fate of every person on the pirate ship. It is somewhat 
understandable why sailors thought this to be true because a signed copy of the articles in 
the hands of the court would be documentary evidence against the sailor. The minority of 
forced sailors said they flat out refused to sign the articles. Pirates were more likely to 
torture and subjugate sailors who refused to sign the articles however, if they could 
survive to stand trial they were more likely to be found innocent.181 In the event an 
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accused sailor did sign the articles, they would testify on how much force was required to 
make them sign. 
For example, Birdstock Weaver was a sailor who claimed he was forced to sign the 
pirate articles at his trial in 1725. He recounts his story as follows,   
When I came on Board the Good Fortune, they gave me their Articles to Sign, 
setting me (with a Bible to Swear upon) before a large Looking-glass, and 
placing two Men behind me with loaded Pistols to Shoot me if I refused, so 
that I was terrified into a Compliance.182   
 
Weaver’s testimony came towards the end of his trial and even with this story, he 
fulfilled enough conditions to cross the line into piracy. With this in mind and the little 
weight given to the testimony of sailors accused of piracy, it is reasonable to see why 
Weaver was found guilty and sentenced to death.183 However, what happened next does 
not fit in the current conditions and criteria because Weaver was not executed but was 
pardoned a month after his trial. Weaver had obtained a letter from a former captain on 
his behalf and fulfilled a criteria that made the courts overturn their initial decision.184 
																																																																																																																																																																					
island for many years, see Gregory N. Flemming, At the Point of a Cutlass: The Pirate Capture, Bold 
Escape, and Lonely Exile of Phillip Ashton (Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge, 2014).    
182 “Trials: Birdstock Weaver and William Ingram” ed., E.T. Fox, Pirates in Their Own Words: Eye-
Witness Accounts of the ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy, 1690-1728 (Fox Historical, 2014), 325. 
183 “The Examination of Thomas Lawrence Jones,” ed., E.T. Fox, Pirates in Their Own Words: Eye-
Witness Accounts of the ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy, 1690-1728 (Fox Historical, 2014), 155-160.; Thomas 
Lawrence Jones was examined in 1720 and testified on behalf of Weaver being a forced sailor but at the 
time Jones was incarcerated in the Marshalsea, a prison in Southern Britain, for acts of piracy. Therefore, it 
is not likely that the court took Jones’s examination seriously. Jones died in prison before he was brought to 
trial.; Fox, “Trials: Birdstock Weaver,” Pirates in Their Own Words, 320-329. Ten witnesses, including 
Thomas Lawrence Jones, offered testimony on Weaver. However, three offered only character references 
from before and after his time as a suspected pirate. Weaver spent almost two years on land in London 
before he was brought to trial. On the conditions and criteria: At Weaver’s trial, seven witnesses 
inadequately proved that he had taken a share of the plunder and carried a weapon while on board a prize 
vessel as part of the pirate crew, which fulfilled the courts conditions. Weaver also never produced a 
document from a former captain saying he was forced and witnesses claimed he most likely had 
opportunities to escape from the pirates. On the other hand, Weaver was overwhelmingly cleared of the 
conditions from the perspective of the witnesses because they testified that he had not mistreated them as 
captives or appear to emotional accept the pirate life. The count was five proved against Weaver and two, 
from the witnesses’ perspective, proved in his favor.     
184 “Trials: Birdstock Weaver” ed., E.T. Fox, Pirates in Their Own Words, 328-329. 
		
	 	
104	
Until a sailor was executed for piracy, as seen in the trial of Birdstock Weaver there was 
still hope for a pardon.  
 The fourth condition in the second phase was almost entirely improvable by 
witness testimony and was a last resort for a sailor accused of piracy. If an accused sailor 
could not tell a story were they suffered undue hardship, like the one told by Birdstock 
Weaver, then they met this final condition. This was similar to the way forced sailors 
attempted to appeal to the captives on board a pirate ship by treating them civilly and 
showing an aversion to the pirate way of life. The story had to be a tale of how the 
accused sailor suffered extreme violence or torture at the hands of the pirates. Accused 
sailors attempted to appeal to the humanity of the agents of the courts and show that they 
did not met this condition by telling a convincing story of suffering.  
  An example came from the crewmember of a sailor who was forced to serve on a 
pirate ship, which was published in an advertisement in the Boston News-Letter around 
1725. Crewmembers who escaped sometimes put out these ads to prove the innocence of 
a sailor who was forced to go with pirates. Ebenezer Mower was a sailor on the sloop 
Fancy on a voyage from Rhode-Island to the West Indies in the Summer of 1725. The 
Fancy was over taken by a pirate ship named the Sea Nymph commanded by Phillip Lyn. 
The pirate Lyn and his crew boarded the ship and took several captives to the Sea Nymph. 
On the pirate ship the prisoners were “all greatly abus’d,” but “one of the Pirates struck 
[Ebenezer] Mower many Blows on his head with the Helve of an Ax.” The pirates then 
preceded to hold Mower’s head over the opening to the lower decks and said that if he 
did not “Sign their Articles immediately, [they] would cut his Head off.” Eventually, after 
much more coercing Mower signed the articles. He told his fellow captives that he was 
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“ruin’d and undone… crying at the same time” because he signed the articles of piracy.185 
These stories of suffering were appearing more and more in trials, captive narratives, and 
newspapers in the eighteenth century, so much so that they were hard for one not to 
believe. The forced pirate was starting to take on a humanized role on the pirate ship and 
courts in particular were not able to say that everyone on a pirate ship was a pirate.    
 Since not everyone on a pirate ship was a pirate a more nuanced look at the 
operation of the pirate ship showed a change when more sailors were forced to serve as 
part of the crew. In other words, there was a shift in the hierarchy of a pirate ships 
operation. The hierarchy changed from one based on race to one based on willingness. As 
seen from the story of Phillip Ashton those that were unwilling to join the pirate crew 
would be forced to do the drudge work. In addition, they would be subjected to routine 
torture and violence. Forced pirate crew members, like Ashton, were skilled sailors, but 
they were forced do the things that were considered menial to the willing pirate crew. 
This fundamentally changed how the pirate ship operated and was unique to the pirates of 
the Golden Age of piracy.          
For example, Jonathan Clarke was a sailor who was tried along with Major Stede 
Bonnet and other members of his crew.186 The story of Clarke exemplified the change to 
a hierarchy of willingness on the pirate ship. Clarke and a group of several other sailors 
attempted their escape after being taken by Bonnet and his crew. This group testified that 
they had “travell’d four days in the Woods without eating of drinking, and could find the 
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way to no Plantation… and with Hunger was forced to return again”187 When Clarke 
returned he said he was immediately threatened by Major Bonnet.  Clarke testified that if 
he did not sign the articles of piracy and “design to do as they did” by the following day 
Major Bonnet would either make him “Governor of the first island he came to… an leave 
[him] there,” or make him work as a slave. Major Bonnet supposedly assigned a guard to 
watch Clarke and force him to work the pumps below deck. Clarke said that his guard 
was “one of the Negros [who] came over and demanded me, and asked me why I did not 
go to the Pump, and told me that was my Business.”188  
Clarke describes his scenario as one of extreme hardship, having escaped only to 
be forced to return and threatened with a choice between starving on an isolated island or 
work among the slaves. His situation also resulted in a break from cultural norms when a 
slave was assigned to guard him and “the Negros insulted over him” as descried by 
Nicholas Trott the Judge in the trial. Judge Trott, also the Chief Justice of the Province of 
South Carolina, usually provide a short recap and spoke on the evidence provided by 
credible witnesses. In this trial Judge Trott, gave almost a full recap of the story told by 
Jonathan Clarke and highlighted the mention when a slave was placed in charge of him 
which constituted a break with cultural norms.189 Clarke was eventually found not guilty 
of acts of piracy and released; his account was important to illustrate the change in the 
hierarchy and operation of pirate ships in the eighteenth century.   
 
																																																								
187 Ibid, 360. This testimony comes from the combined testimony of Jonathan Clark and Rowland 
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Conclusion 
   
The Golden Age pirate was different than any other group of pirates in previous 
centuries. The eighteenth century pirate failed to maintain connections to local land-based 
communities willing to work with them. This disconnection from the land caused pirates 
to become more violent and force more sailors to join their crews. The British and 
colonial governments observed the phenomenon of the forced sailor and developed a set 
of conditions to separate the pirate from the forced sailor in the colonial courts. The first 
conditions began to develop starting round 1717. These conditions were based on what 
captives of pirates could easily observe while on the ship for short periods and then 
testify to. The second set of conditions started to rise to dominance around 1722 and was 
based more on the accused sailors’ testimony. The second set humanized the plight of the 
forced sailor and the willingness to take accused sailors at their word signaled the British 
and colonial governments recognized the phenomenon of the forced sailor. There was 
also an underlying change to the ways pirate ships operated. The pirate ship shifted from 
a hierarchy of race to a hierarchy of willingness. Pirates had to adapt and survive without 
the resource of local communities. This created a whole new form of piracy which was 
more reliant on the community of piracy, more conscious of their identity as pirates, and 
more independent of any nation. 
 Piracy in the eighteenth century was distinct from earlier forms of piracy because 
of the shift from the Caribbean in the seventeenth century and the failure to build 
relationships with local land-based communities on the North American coast in the 
eighteenth century. The basic problem was that no colonies both willing and suitable to 
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serve as a pirate base in North America, though several were tried. In South Carolina, at 
the turn of the eighteenth century pirates had some success in turning the colony into a 
pirate community because of the political and economic acceptance. Pirates assisted the 
Charlestown colony to grow and become a major rice producer for Britain. When pirates 
were no longer an asset however, they were expelled, which caused violent retaliations 
by them. These retaliations only served to harden the resolve on the colony against 
piracy. In Rhode Island, pirates also found some acceptance, but their influence was 
limited. The independent nature of the colony along with a reliance on external trade 
gave pirates some ability to build relationships with the colony. Rhode Island, however, 
did not offer much lucrative trade, and so was of little benefit to pirates; thus, when the 
colony began to turn against piracy, pirates simply abandoned their attempts at building 
relationships. In Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, no permanent stable colonies existed. 
Pirates could not build lasting relationships and so they used the area as hunting grounds 
for recruits and supplies. This type of hunting ground could sustain piracy for a time but 
without local counties it could not endure. When willing recruits became hard to find 
because of the loss of friendly local communities pirates used the area around Nova 
Scotia to steal supplies and force sailors onto their crews.  
The shift and disconnection from the land caused pirates to become more violent 
and force more sailors to join their crews in order to survive. The phenomenon of forcing 
more sailors onto the pirate crew changed how the courts tried them and how the pirate 
ship operated. The courts adapted to ensure that innocent sailors were not sent to the 
gallows. The pirates adapted to forcing more sailors by changing their operations from a 
hierarchy of race to one of willingness. This made the pirate ship appear more democratic 
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in its operation. An emphasis was placed on making sailors on pirate ships culpable to 
piracy by making them sign articles, go on prize vessels in their turn, and assist with the 
operation of the ship. Instead of intentionally being more democratic the characteristics 
that made the Golden Age of piracy appear that way were because of a desperation to 
survive. Pirates forcing more sailors changed the operation of the ship, which resulted in 
a hierarchy of willingness rather than merely of class and race. This change in the 
operation led to an unintentional and dysfunctional democratic society on the pirate ship. 
The result was merely a byproduct of the loss of friendly communities willing to accept 
pirates in the Atlantic World.  
The story, so far, has been one unique to the Atlantic World, and very much tied 
to local conditions.  It seems likely, however, that this type of change was in many ways 
a global phenomena, though in each place dependent on local conditions.  In China, for 
example piracy in the early eighteenth century was in a similar situation and it was 
“deeply integrated into the political economy of coastal China.” 190  Thus a fuller 
examination of the relations between pirates and local communities, and the ways in 
which that relationship shaped pirate communities, might usefully involve global 
comparisons.  In any case, however, it seems clear that piracy cannot be explained by 
looking solely at the pirates. 
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Appendix A (Chronological List of Trials with Reference Locations)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Name Year Location of Trial Reference Location 
The Lives, Apprehensions, Arraignments, 
and Executions of the 19 Late Pyrates 
1609 St. Margrets Hill in 
Southwark 
Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 2. (5-64) 
The Grand Pirate: or, The life and Death 
of Capt. George Cusack 
1674 Justice Hall - Old-Baily Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 2. (69-
99) 
High Court of Admiralty Record of the 
Trial for Piracy and Murder  
1682 Southwark Basil Ringrose, A Buccaneer’s Atlas: Basil Ringrose’s South 
Sea Waggoner, ed., Derek Howse and Norman Thrower 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992) 
An Account of the Tryals of Captain J. 
Golden 
1694 Marshalsea in Southwark Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 2. (107-
108) 
The Tryals of Joseph Dawson 1696 Old-Baily Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 2. (115-
142) 
The Arraignment, Tryal, and 
Condemnation, of Capt. William Kidd 
1701 Old-Baily Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 2. (149-
208) 
The Arraignment, Tryal, and 
Condemnation, of Capt. John Quelch 
1704 Boston,  Massachusetts 
Bay, New-England 
Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 2. (263-
288) 
The Tryal of Captain Thomas Green and 
his Crew 
1705 Edinburgh, Scotland Eighteenth Century Collections Online (Gale Cengage 
Learning)  
The Trial of George North and Other 
Pirates 
1716 Charles-Town, South 
Carolina 
Records of the South Carolina Court of Admirality, 1716-32: 
Parts 1-2, A-B, National Archives, Microfilm, 20-28. 
The Trial of Francis DeMont and Others 1717 Charles-Town, South 
Carolina 
Records of the South Carolina Court of Admirality, 1716-32: 
Parts 1-2, A-B, National Archives, Microfilm, 50-67. 
The Trials of Eight Persons Indited for 
Piracy  
1717 Boston,  Massachusetts 
Bay, New-England 
Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 2. (293-
319)  
The Trial of the Pirates at Providence 1718 New Providence, Bahama 
Islands, City of Nassau 
Johnson, Charles (Daniel Defoe). History of the Pirates.  
The Trials of Major Stede Bonnet 1718 Charles-Town, South 
Carolina 
Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 2. (321-
380) 
The Trials of Aaron Gibbens and 
William Bournal 
1720 Sessions House, St. 
George's? 
Fox, E.T. Pirates in Their Own Words. (309-319) 
The Trials of Captain John Rackam and 
other Pirates  
1721 St. Jago de la Vega 
(Spanish Town), Jamaica 
Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 3. (7-66) 
The Tryal of all the Pyrates, Lately 
Taken by Captain Ogle 
1722 British Ship Swallow off 
the coast of Africa  
Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 3. (73-
166) 
Tryals of Thirty-Six Persons for Piracy  1723 Newpot, Rhode-Island and 
Providence Plantations 
Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 3. (171-
192) 
The Trial of Nicholas Simmons and 
Others 
1724 Newpot, Rhode-Island and 
Providence Plantations 
Fox, E.T. Pirates in Their Own Words. (329-342) 
Case of John Rose Archer and Others 1724 Boston,  Massachusetts 
Bay, New-England 
Jameson, John Franklin. Privateering and Piracy in the 
Colonial Period. (323-355) 
The Trials of Birdstock Weaver and 
William Ingram 
1725 Justice Hall - Old-Baily Fox, E.T. Pirates in Their Own Words. (320-328) 
The Tryals of Five Persons for Piracy 1726 Boston,  Massachusetts 
Bay, New-England 
Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 3. (197-
230) 
The Tryals of Sixteen Persons for Piracy  1726 Boston,  Massachusetts 
Bay, New-England 
Baer, Joel. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 3. (235-
259) 
Lieutenant Richardson the Pirate. 1738 New York and Elsewhere Raymond, Postgate, Murder, Piracy, and Treason: A 
Selection of Notable English Trials (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1925), 144-152.  
		
	 	
111	
Bibliography 
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
"Address of the Representatives of South Carolina to the King, America and West Indies: 
March 1716, 15-31," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West 
Indies: Volume 29, 1716-1717, ed. Cecil Headlam. London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1930, 49-55. British History Online, accessed August 9, 2017, 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-
indies/vol29/pp49-55. 
 
“Addvertisements, Depositions from Bermuda” New England: The Boston News-Letter, 
Number 1140, November 25 – December 2 1725, ed., John H. Baer, British Piracy 
in the Golden Age, vol. 1. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 330.  
 
“Advertisement of Benjamin Norton” New England: The Boston News-Letter, Number 
915, August 7-14, 1721, published in John H. Baer, ed. British Piracy in the Golden 
Age, vol. 1. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 325. 
 
“Advertisement” New England: The Boston News-Letter, Number 859, August 22-29, 
1720, published in John H. Baer, ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, vol. 1. 
London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 324.    
 
“Addvertisments” New England: The Boston News-Letter Num. 962, July 9, 1722, in 
British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed. John H. Baer, vol. 1. London: Pickering & 
Chatto, 2007, 326. 
 
“Advertisements, Memorandum” New England: The Boston Gazette, Number 202, 
September 30-October 7, 1723, published in John H. Baer, ed. British Piracy in the 
Golden Age, vol. 1. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 328. 
 
“Advertisement: Province of the Massachusetts Bay” New England: The Boston News-
Letter, Number 962, July 2-9, 1722, published in John H. Baer, ed. British Piracy in 
the Golden Age, vol. 1. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 326. 
 
“Agreement to Commit Piracy,” Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period: 
Illustrative Documents, ed. John Franklin Jameson. New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1923, 141-142. 
 
"A Paper Submitted to the Commissioners of Customs by Edward Randolph, America 
and West Indies: August 1696, 17-31," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 
America and West Indies: Volume 15, 1696-1697, ed. J W Fortescue. London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1904, 71-91. British History Online, accessed June 7, 
2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-
indies/vol15/pp71-91. 
		
	 	
112	
 
"Appendix: Copy of Capt. Plowman’s Commission,” in British Piracy in the Golden Age, 
ed. John H. Baer, vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 284-285.   
 
“A Prefatory Account of the Taking of Major Stede Bonnet,” in British Piracy in the 
Golden Age, ed. John H. Baer, vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 327-330. 
 
“An Account of the Tryals of Captain J. Golden,” in British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed. 
John H. Baer, vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 107-108. 
 
Ash, John. “The Present State of Affairs in Carolina, By John Ash, 1706,” Narratives of 
Early Carolina 1650-1708, ed. Alexander Salley. rept. 1911, New York: Barnes & 
Noble, Inc., 1967. 
 
Baer, John H. ed. British Piracy in the Golden Age, Vol. 1-4. London: Pickering & 
Chatto, 2007. 
 
Bartlett, John Russell ed., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations in New England, vol. 3. Providence, RI: Knowles Anthony & Co., 1858, 
Sabin Americana, Gale, Cengage Learning, accessed 12 October 2017. 
 
Beattie, Tim. British Privateering Voyages of the Early Eighteenth Century. New York: 
The Boybell Press, 2015.  
 
“By the King: A Proclamation for Suppressing of Pirates,” September 5, 1717, in 
Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations Relating to America, 1603-
1783. rept. 1911, New York: Burt Franklin, 1968, 176-177. 
 
“Case of John Rose Archer and Others” in Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial 
Period: Illustrative Documents, ed. John Franklin Jameson. New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1923, 323-345. 
 
" Circulation letter form Mr. Secretary Craggs to Governors, December 24, 1718, 
America and West Indies: December 1718, 22-31," in Calendar of State Papers 
Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 30, 1717-1718, ed. Cecil Headlam. 
London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930, 424-446. British History Online, 
accessed 17 February 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-
papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol30/pp424-446. 
 
"Col. Jenings, President of the Council of Virginia, to the Council of Trade and 
Plantations America and West Indies: June 1710," in Calendar of State Papers 
Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 25, 1710-1711, ed. Cecil Headlam 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1924), 108-122. British History Online, 
accessed June 3, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-
papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol25/pp108-122 
 
		
	 	
113	
“Collection of News Paper Articles on Forced Men,” ed., John H. Baer, British Piracy in 
the Golden Age, vol. 1. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 325-331. 
 
“Commission for Trial of Piracy. November 1, 1716” in Privateering and Piracy in the 
Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents, ed. John Franklin Jameson, New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1923. 286-290. 
 
"Council of Trade and Plantations to Lord Bolingbroke, America and West Indies: 
August 1714." Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 
28, 1714-1715. Ed. Cecil Headlam. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928. 
1-19. British History Online. Web. 15 October 2017. http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol28/pp1-19. 
 
“Cranston to Board of Trade,” Newport, Dec. 5, 1708, Colonial Office 5/1264, no.92. 
 
Donnan, Elizabeth. ed., “Negroes Imported into South Carolina, 1706-1724,” Documents 
Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America. New York: Octagon, 1965. 
 
"Edward Lloyd, President of the Council of Maryland, to the Council of Trade and 
Plantations America and West Indies: July 1712," in Calendar of State Papers 
Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 27, 1712-1714, ed. Cecil Headlam 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926), 1-20. British History Online, 
accessed June 3, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-
papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol27/pp1-20  
 
“Edward Randolph to the Council of Trade and Plantations, America and West Indies: 
February 1701, 11-20," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West 
Indies: Volume 19, 1701, ed. Cecil Headlam. London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1910, 74-94. British History Online, accessed June 7, 2017, 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-
indies/vol19/pp74-94. 
 
Elizabeth Donnan, ed., “Governor and Council of South Carolina to the Board of Trade, 
1709,” Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America. New 
York: Octagon Books Inc., 1965, 256.  
 
Elizabeth Donnan, ed., “Negroes Imported Into South Carolina, 1706-1724,” Documents 
Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America. New York: Octagon Books 
Inc., 1965, 255.  
 
Exquemelin, Alexander O. The Buccaneers of America, Translated by Alexis Brown. 
Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2000. 
 
“Extract of a letter from a Merchant in S. Carolina to a Merchant in London, America and 
West Indies: May 1727, 16-31," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and 
West Indies: Volume 35, 1726-1727, ed. Cecil Headlam and Arthur Percival Newton. 
		
	 	
114	
London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936, 286-295. British History Online, 
accessed June 3, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-
papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol35/pp286-295. 
 
Fox, E.T. ed, Pirates in Their Own Words: Eye-Witness Accounts of the ‘Golden Age’ of 
Piracy, 1690-1728. Fox Historical, 2014. 
 
Giles Sylvester’s Oath, Aug 27. 1705, Colonial Office(CO) 5/1263, no. 57xvi. 
 
“Governor and Council of South Carolina to the Board of Trade, 1709,” Documents 
Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America. New York: Octagon Books 
Inc., 1965, 256.   
 
"Governor and Council of South Carolina to the Council of Trade and Plantations , 
America and West Indies: October 1718," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 
America and West Indies: Volume 30, 1717-1718, ed. Cecil Headlam. London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930, 359-381. British History Online, accessed June 3, 
2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-
indies/vol30/pp359-381. 
 
“Governor Codrington to Council of Trade and Plantations, America and West Indies: 
July 1697, 1-10," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: 
Volume 15, 1696-1697, ed. J W Fortescue. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1904, 528-545. British History Online, accessed July 9, 2017, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol15/pp528-545. 
 
"Governor Johnson to the Council of Trade and Plantations June 18, America and West 
Indies: June 1718," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: 
Volume 30, 1717-1718, ed. Cecil Headlam. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1930, 264-287. British History Online, accessed August 9, 2017, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol30/pp264-287. 
 
“Governor Nicholson to the Council of Trade and Plantations, America and West Indies: 
July 1703, 26-31," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: 
Volume 21, 1702-1703, ed. Cecil Headlam. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1913, 574-593. British History Online, accessed June 7, 2017, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol21/pp574-593. 
 
"Governor Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, America and West Indies: June 
1718." in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 30, 
1717-1718. Ed. Cecil Headlam. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930. 264-
287. British History Online. Web. 8 October 2017. http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol30/pp264-287. 
 
Green, Thomas. “The Tryal of Capt. Thomas Green and his crew, before the judge of the 
High Court of Admiralty of Scotland...” Published by authority. London, 1705, 
		
	 	
115	
Eighteenth Century Collections Online. James Madison University. 9 Apr. 2017.   
 
“Information of Andrew Turbett, Master, and Robert Gilmor, supercargo of the Agnis of 
Glasgow, America and West Indies: May 1717, 16-31," in Calendar of State Papers 
Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 29, 1716-1717, ed. Cecil Headlam. 
London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930, 303-322. British History Online, 
accessed October 30, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-
papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol29/pp303-322. 
 
“Instructions to the Living from the Conditions of the Dead,” in British Piracy in the 
Golden Age, ed. John H. Baer, vol. 4. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 125-153.  
 
Jameson, John Franklin. ed., Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period: Illustrative 
Documents. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. 
 
John Carter Brown Library, Providence, RI, Stevens Collection, vol. 8, n.498. 
 
Johnson, Charles (Daniel Defoe). A General History of the Pirates, ed. Arthur L. 
Hayward .London: George Routledge & Sons, 1926. 
 
"Letter from Mr. Secretary St. John for the Board's opinion, Journal, April 1712: Journal 
Book P." Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations: Volume 2, February 1709 
- March 1715. Ed. E G Atkinson. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925. 
352-361. British History Online. Web. 8 October 2017. http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/jrnl-trade-plantations/vol2/pp352-361. 
 
“Letter to Mr. Boone, America and West Indies: June 1720," in Calendar of State Papers 
Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 32, 1720-1721, ed. Cecil Headlam. 
London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933, 44-60. British History Online, 
accessed June 3, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-
papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp44-60. 
 
"Lt. Governor Doucett to M. St. Ovide Brouillan, America and West Indies: June 
1718." in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 30, 
1717-1718. Ed. Cecil Headlam. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930. 264-
287. British History Online. Web. 8 October 2017. http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol30/pp264-287. 
 
“Memorial of Sir Robert Robinson to the King, America and West Indies: November 
1696, 21-30," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: 
Volume 15, 1696-1697, ed. J W Fortescue. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1904, 219-231. British History Online, accessed June 7, 2017, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol15/pp219-231. 
 
“New York, Dec 25,” Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer (London, England), Saturday, 
February 28, 1719. 17th-18th Century Burney Collection Newspapers. 
		
	 	
116	
 
Raymond Postgate, ed., Murder, Piracy and Treason: A Selection of Notable English 
Trials. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925. 
 
Reese, George. ed., Proceedings in the Court of Vic-Admiralty of Virginia, 1698-1775. 
Richmond, VA: Virginia State Library, 1983.     
 
“Records of the South Carolina Court of Admiralty, 1716-32: Parts 1-2, A-B.” South 
Carolina, Court of Vice-Admiralty. Princeton University Library, Microfilm ReCAP 
1218.868. 
 
“Records of the Vice Admiralty Court of the Province of New York: Record Group 21, 
Roll 1, Minutes, v. 1-3, 1701-74.” New York (State). Court of Vice Admiralty. The 
National Archives of the United States, 1934, Microfilm T-842. Roll 1. 
 
Ringrose, Basil. A Buccaneer’s Atlas: A Sea Atlas and Sailing Directions of the Pacific 
Coast of the Americas, 1682. edited by Derek Howse & Norman J.W. Thrower. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. 
 
“The Affidavit of Capt. Peter Manwareing,” in British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed., 
John H. Baer vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 380.  
 
“The Arraignment, Tryal, and Condemnation, of Capt. William Kidd,” in British Piracy 
in the Golden Age, ed. John H. Baer. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007. vol. 2, 149. 
 
“The Arraignment, Tryal, and Condemnation, of Capt. John Quelch” British Piracy in the 
Golden Age, ed., John H. Baer vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 257-288.   
 
“The Articles of Agreement between Capt. Low and his Company,” in British Piracy in 
the Golden Age, ed. John H. Baer, vol. 3. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 191. 
 
“The Examination of Birdstock Weaver,” Pirates in Their Own Words: Eye-Witness 
Accounts of the ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy, 1690-1728, ed. E.T. Fox. Fox Historical, 
2014, 195-198. 
 
“The Examination of Thomas Lawrence Jones,” ed., E.T. Fox. Pirates in Their Own 
Words: Eye-Witness Accounts of the ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy, 1690-1728, ed. E.T. 
Fox. Fox Historical, 2014, 155-160.  
 
“The Grand Pirate: or, The life and Death of Capt. George Cusack,” in British Piracy in 
the Golden Age, ed. John H. Baer, vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 69. 
 
 “The Lives, Apprehensions, Arraignments, and Executions of the 19 Late Pyrates,” in 
British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed. John H. Baer, vol. 2. London: Pickering & 
Chatto, 2007, 5-64. 
 
		
	 	
117	
“The Trial of Nicholas Simonds” Pirates in Their Own Words: Eye-Witness Accounts of 
the ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy, 1690-1728. ed., E.T. Fox. Fox Historical, 2014, 329.  
 
“The Trial of the Pirates at Providence” in A General History of the Pirates, Johnson, 
Charles (Daniel Defoe). ed. Arthur L. Hayward. London: George Routledge & Sons, 
1926, 576-592. 
 
“The Trials of Aaron Gibbens and William Bournal,” Pirates in Their Own Words: Eye-
Witness Accounts of the ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy, 1690-1728, ed. E.T. Fox. Fox 
Historical, 2014, 309-318. 
 
“The Trials of Eight Persons Indited for Piracy,” in British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed. 
John H. Baer, vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 289- 320.  
 
“The Tryal of the Pirates Taken by Captain Ogle” British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed., 
John H. Baer vol. 3. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 67-166.  
 
“The Tryals of Captain John Rackam and other Pirates” in British Piracy in the Golden 
Age, ed. John H. Baer, vol. 3. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 7-66. 
 
“The Tryals of Five Persons for Piracy,” in British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed. John H. 
Baer, vol. 3. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 197-230. 
 
“The Tryals of Joseph Dawson,” in British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed. John H. Baer, 
vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 115-142. 
 
“The Tryals of Major Stede Bonnet” British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed., John H. Baer. 
vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 321-380.  
 
“The Tryals of Sixteen Persons for Piracy,” in British Piracy in the Golden Age, ed. John 
H. Baer, vol. 3. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 235-260. 
 
Towle, Dorothy. ed., Records of the Vice-Admiralty Court of Rhode Island, 1716-1752. 
Washington, DC: The American Historical Association, 1936. 
   
“Trials: Birdstock Weaver and William Ingram” Pirates in Their Own Words: Eye-
Witness Accounts of the ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy, 1690-1728. ed., E.T. Fox. Fox 
Historical, 2014, 320-328. 
 
“Tryals of Thirty-Six Persons for Piracy,” ed. John H. Baer, British Piracy in the Golden 
Age, vol. 3. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007, 167-192. 
 
William Snelgrave, A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea (London: James, John, and 
Paul Knapton, at the Crown in Ludgate Street, 1734), Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online. Gale, 199. 
 
		
	 	
118	
Secondary Sources 
 
Anderson, John L. “Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime 
Predation,” Bandits at Sea: A Pirate Reader, ed. C. R. Pennell. New York: New 
York University Press, 2001.  
 
Andreas, Peter. Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
 
Antony, Robert. Pirates in the Age of Sail. New York: A Norton Casebook in History, 
2007.  
 
Arquilla, John. Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare 
Have Shaped Our World. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011. 
 
Baer, John H. ed. “Introduction to Volume 2 and 3” British Piracy in the Golden Age, 
vol. 2. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007. 
 
Baer, John H. Pirates. Great Britain: Tempus, 2007. 
 
Berquist, Charles. “The Paradox of American Development,” The Atlantic World in the 
Age of Empire, ed. Thomas Benjamin, Timothy Hall, and David Rutherford. 
Houghton Mifflin, 2001. 
 
Bialuschewski, Arne. “Black People Under the Black Flag: Piracy and the Slave Trade 
on the West Coast of Africa, 1718-1723.” Slavery and Abolition 29, no. 4 
(December, 2008): 461-475. 
 
                                 . “Pirates, Black Sailors and Seafaring Slaves in the Anglo-American 
Maritime World, 1716-1726.” Journal of Caribbean History 45, no. 2 (December 
2011): 143-158. 
 
                                 . “Pirates, Slavers, and the Indigenous Population in Madagascar, c. 
1690-1715.” International Journal of African Historical Studies 38, no. 3 (January, 
2005): 401-425. 
 
Bolster, W. Jeffery. Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
 
Bradley, Peter T. The Lure of Peru: Maritime Intrusion in the South Sea, 1598-1701. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989. 
 
Burg, B. R. Sodomy & the Perception of Evil: English Sea Rovers in the Seventeenth-
Century Caribbean. New York: NYU Press, 1983. 
 
Burgess, Douglas. The Pirates Pact: The Secret Alliances Between History’s Most 
		
	 	
119	
Notorious Buccaneers and Colonial America. New York: McGraw Hill, 2009.  
 
Burgess, Douglas. The Politics of Piracy: Crime and Civil Disobedience in Colonial 
America. Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge, 2014. 
 
Choate, Jean. At Sea Under Impressment: Accounts of Involuntary Service Aboard Navy 
and Pirate Vessels, 1700-1820. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2010. 
 
Clifford, Barry. The Black Ship: The Quest to Recover an English Pirate Ship and its 
Lost Treasure. London: Headline, 1999. 
 
Cordingly, David. Pirate Hunter of the Caribbean: The Adventurous Life of Captain 
Woodes Rogers. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2012. 
 
                            . Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Reality of Life Among the 
Pirates. New York: Random House, 1995. 
 
Davis, Stephen. Mi’kmaq. Halifax, NS: Nimbus Publishing, 1997.  
 
Delage, Denys. “The Fur Trade of New France,” The Atlantic World in the Age of 
Empire, ed., Thomas Benjamin, Timothy Hall, & David Rutherford. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001, 139-140.   
 
Deampire, William. Memories of a Buccaneer Dampier’s New Voyage Round the World. 
Mineola, NY: Dove Publications, 2007. 
 
Earl, Peter. The Pirate Wars. London: Methuen, 2003. 
 
Flemming, Gregory. At the Point of a Cutlass: The Pirate Capture, Bold Escape, and 
Lonely Exile of Philip Ashton. New England: ForeEdge, 2014.  
 
Frohock, Richard. Buccaneers and Privateers: The Story of the English Sea Rover, 1675-
1725. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2012. 
 
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. rept. 1968, New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 2005. 
 
Galvin, Peter R. Patterns of Pillage: A Geography of Caribbean-Based Piracy in Spanish 
America, 1536-1718. New York: Peter Lang, 1999. 
 
Garcia, Ana Catarina Abrantes. “New Ports of the New World: Angra, Funchal, Port 
Royal and Bridgetown,” The International Journal of Maritime History 29, no. 1 
(2017): 155-174, doi: 10.1177/0843871416677952.  
  
Gerhard, Peter. Pirates of New Spain, 1575-1742. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 
2003. 
		
	 	
120	
 
                      . Pirates of the Pacific, 1575-1742. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1990.  
 
Gibbs, Joseph. On the Account: Piracy and the Americas, 1766-1835 .Portland, OR: 
Academic Press, 2012. 
 
Greer, Allan. “French Colonization of New France,” The Atlantic World in the Age of 
Empire, ed., Thomas Benjamin, Timothy Hall, & David Rutherford (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), 191-195 
 
Hanna, Mark. Pirate Nest and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015.  
 
                    . “Protecting the Rights of Englishmen: The Rise and Fall of Carolina’s 
Piratical State,” Creating and Contesting Carolina: Proprietary Era History, ed. 
Michelle LeMaster and Bradofrd J. Wood. Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2013, 295-317. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric. Bandits. New York: Delacorte Press, 1969. 
 
Hughson, Shirley C. The Carolina Pirates and Colonial Commerce, 1670-1740. repr. 
1894, Spartanburg, SC: The Reprint Company, 1971. 
 
James, Sydney. Colonial Rhode Island: A History. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1975. 
 
Joes, Anthony James. Guerrilla Warfare: A History, Biographical, and Bibliographic 
Sourcebook. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1996. 
 
Kemp, P. K. and Christopher Lloyd. Brethren of the Coast: Buccaneers of the South 
Seas. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1960. 
 
Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Konstam, Angus. Piracy: The Complete History. Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2008.  
 
Kuhn, Gabriel. Life Under the Jolly Roger: Reflections on Golden Age Piracy. Oakland, 
CA: PM Press, 2010. 
 
Land, Chris. “Flying the Black Flag: Revolt, Revolution and the Social Organization of 
Piracy in the ‘Golden Age’,” Management and Organization History 2, no. 2 (2007): 
169-192. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1744935907078726.   
   
Lane, Kris E. Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas 1500-1750. Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1998. 
		
	 	
121	
 
Lee, Robert E. Blackbeard the Pirate: A Reappraisal of his Life and Times. 1974 repr., 
Winston-Salem, NC: John R. Blair, 2006. 
 
Lennon, Donald R. “Cape Fear River Settlements,” Encyclopedia of North Carolina, 
William S. Powell, ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. 
 
Linebaugh, Peter and Marcus Rediker. The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, 
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2000. 
 
Little, Benerson. Pirate Hunting: The Fight Against Pirate, Privateers, and Sea Raiders 
from Antiquity to the Present. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010.  
 
                          . The Buccaneer’s Realm: Pirate life on the Spanish Main, 1674-1688. 
Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007.  
 
                          . The Golden Age of Piracy: The Truth Behind Pirate Myths. New York, 
NY: Skyhouse Publishing, 2016. 
 
                          . The Sea Rovers Practice: Pirate Tactics and Techniques, 1630-1730. 
Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005. 
 
McGinty, Brian. The Rest I Will Kill: William Tillman and the Unforgettable Story of 
how a Free Black Man Refused to Become a Slave. New York: Liveright Publishing 
Corp. 2016. 
 
Manwaring, G. E. Woodes Rogers: Privateer and Governor. Nassau, Bahamas: The 
Deans Peggs Reseach Fund, 1975. 
 
Marx, Jenifer. Pirates and Privateers of the Caribbean. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing 
Co. 1992. 
 
McDonald, Kevin P. Pirates, Merchants, Settlers, and Slaves: Colonial America and the 
Indo-Atlantic World. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015. 
 
Oatis, Steven J. A Colonial Complex: South Carolina’s Frontiers in the Era of the 
Yamasee War, 1680-1730. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004. 
 
O’Malley, Gregory E. “Diversity in the Slave Trade to the Colonial Carolinas,” Creating 
and Contesting Carolina: Proprietary Era History, ed. Michelle LeMaster and 
Bradofrd J. Wood. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2013, 234-
255. 
 
                                   . Final Passages: The Intercolonial Slave Trade of British America, 
1619-1807. Williamsburg, VA: University of North Carolina Press, 2014. 
		
	 	
122	
 
Palfrey, John Gorham. History of New England: From the Revolution of the Seventeenth 
Century to the Revolution of the Eighteenth. New York: AMS Press, 1966.  
 
Pennell, C. R. Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader. New York: New York University Press, 
2001. 
 
Preston, Diana & Michael. A Pirate of Exquisite Mind: Explorer, Naturalist, and 
Buccaneer the Life of William Dampier. New York: Berkley Books, 2004. 
 
Rankin, Hugh. The Golden Age of Piracy. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969. 
 
Rawlyk, George A. Nova Scotia's Massachusetts. McGill-Queen's University Press, 
1973.   
 
Rediker, Marcus. Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, 
and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987. 
 
                           . Outlaws of the Atlantic: Sailors, Pirates, and Motley Crews in the Age 
of Sail. Boston: Beacon Press, 2014. 
 
                           . The Slave Ship: A Human History. New York: Penguin Books, 2008. 
 
                           . Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2004. 
 
Ritchie, Robert. Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates Cambridge. 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986. 
 
Rubin, Alfred P. The Law of Piracy, 2nd ed. New York: Transnational Publishers, 1998. 
 
Sarkesian, Sam C. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 
1975. 
 
Senior, C. M. A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in its Heyday. London: David & 
Charles, 1976. 
 
Scheerer, Hanno T. “”The Proprietors can’t undertake for what they will do:” A Political 
Interpretation of the South Carolina Revolution in 1719,” Creating and Contesting 
Carolina: Proprietary Era History, ed. Michelle LeMaster and Bradofrd J. Wood. 
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2013, 273-294. 
 
Sherman, Richard P. Robert Johnson: Proprietary and Royal Governor of South 
Carolina. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1966.  
 
		
	 	
123	
Sherry, Frank. Raiders and Rebels: The Golden Age of Piracy. New York: Hearst Marine 
Books, 1986. 
  
Sirmans, M. Eugene. Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763. 
Williamsburg, VA: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. 
 
Turley, Hans. Rum, Sodomy, and the Lash: Piracy Sexuality and Masculine Identity. New 
York: NYU Press, 1999. 
 
Wagner, Kip and L. B. Taylor, Jr. Pieces of Eight: Recovering the Riches of a Lost 
Spanish Treasure Fleet. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1966.  
 
Wang, Wensheng. White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates: Crisis and Reform in the 
Qing Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014. 
 
Warden, G.B. Boston: 1689-1776. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970. 
 
Watson, Alan D. “Settlement of the Coastal Plain, 1650-1775,” Encyclopedia of North 
Carolina, William S. Powell, ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2006. 
 
Weir, Robert M. Colonial South Carolina: A History. Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1983. 
 
Williams, Lloyd. Pirates of Colonial Virginia. Richmond, VA: The Dietz Press, 
Publisher, 1937. 
  
Wolf, Eric. Europe and the People Without History. rept. 1982, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 210. 
 
Woodard, Colin. The Republic of Pirates: Being the True and Surprising Story of the 
Caribbean Pirates and the Man who Brought Them Down. Florida: Harcourt Inc., 
2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
